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ABSTRACT
The Korean financial crisis in 1997 must be seen in light o f  the structural 
weaknesses o f  Korean businesses, which developed with the Korean economy for 
decades. Since the early 1960s, large Korean business conglomerates {Chaebols) have 
played an essential role in the process o f rapid economic development. Chaebols 
expanded dramatically, pooling scarce resources such as entrepreneurship, capital and 
technologies as well as business risk through cross-subsidization among the subsidiaries. 
However, Chaebol growth occurred on a very shaky base, critically vulnerable to external 
shocks. The Chaebol's structural weaknesses include high corporate leverage, 
investment inefficiency and extensive diversification strategy resulting low profitability 
and productivity.
The moral hazard of the Chaebol resulted from their expectation that the 
government would not let these large Korean business conglomerates go bankrupt. As a 
result, large Chaebols were considered ‘too big to fail’. This belief was nurtured through 
the government’s extensive intervention in the financial sector, bailout packages for 
ailing industries as well as industrial targeting and other promotion policies. Thus this 
study examines the structural weaknesses o f the Chaebols in the context o f the moral 
hazard, which is the core o f the Korean financial crisis.
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I. Introduction
1.1 Background
During the past several decades, the rapid economic development o f  South Korea (Korea 
hereafter) has attracted worldwide attention. The country’s rapid economic growth has been 
cited as an exemplary model o f successful economic development and termed an economic 
miracle (World Bank, 1993). Indeed, Korea’s growth performance was remarkable; its nominal 
Gross National Product (CNF) per capita increased by more than 120 times, from less than USS 
80 in I960 to USS 10,543 in 1996 (Bank of Korea, 1998). As a result o f  this dramatic economic 
development, Korea joined the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) in October 1996, becoming the second Asian member after Japan.
The impact o f the Asian financial crisis, however, starting with the plunge of the Thai 
Baht early in July 1997, was dramatically reflected in the Korean currency market at the end of 
1997. The Korean Won dropped 50 percent in value between the end o f 1996 and the end o f 
1997. This financial crisis quickly degenerated into a full economic crisis. Real Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) growth plunged following the fourth quarter o f 1997, and remained negative 
throughout 1998 (See Table I-1). In particular, private consumption and fixed investment 
declined dramatically, mainly due to a severe credit crunch as well as increased market 
uncertainty. Reflecting both this dire growth performance as well as the fallout of economic 
restructuring, the unemployment rate sharply rose to over seven percent in 1998, up from a pre­
crisis level o f two percent. Stagnant domestic demand worked as the major contributing factor to 
the improved current account as it reduced import demand dramatically. In addition, dramatic 
devaluation o f the domestic currency after the crisis increased consumer price inflation to 7.5 
percent in 1998, from 4.5 percent in 1997.
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<Table I-l> Recent Trends in Key Macroeconomic Indicators
(year on year growth rates, percent)
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Gross Domestic Product 8.6 8.9 7.1 5.5 -6.8
Private consumption 7.6 8.3 6.8 3.1 -12.0
Fixed Investment 11.8 11.7 7.1 -3.5 -29.3
Exports 16.5 24.0 13.0 23.6 8.9
Imports 21.7 22.0 14.8 3.8 -20.9
Current Account (USS lOOmillion) -39 -85 -230 -82 97
Unemployment 2.4 2.0 2.0 2.6 7.4
Dishonoured Bill Ratio 0.17 0.20 0.17 0.52 0.55
Source: National Statistical Office: Quoted in Nam et al (1999, p.4).
As a consequence o f this disastrous economic situation, the Korean government turned to 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to request bailout loans on November 21, 1997. A 
request by the government for a financial aid package from the IMF amounting to about USS 57 
billion', the largest in IMF’s history, was approved on December 3, 1997. This initial program 
required tight macroeconomic as well as comprehensive adjustments in the corporate and 
financial sector, including the suspension o f nine insolvent merchant banks.*
Why did Korea find itself in both currency and financial crises? The Korean financial 
crisis was initiated by a series o f large-scale corporate bankruptcies, starting with Hanbo Group 
in early 1997. For a decade preceding this crisis, none of the 30 largest Korean conglomerates 
{Chaebols^) had gone bankrupt, convincing Chaebol owners and international investors that they 
were ‘too big to fail’. Therefore, these massive corporate failures were shocking in Korea. At 
least ten o f the 30 largest Korean conglomerates ran into serious liquidity problems before the 
currency crisis hit the country in late 1997 (See Table 1-2).
‘ USS 21 billion from the IMF, USS 10 billion from the World Bank, USS 4 billion from the Asian Development 
Bank, and the rest from bilateral loans (Corsetti et al, 1998).
’ For more details, see Corsetti et al, “What caused the Asian currency and financial crisis? Part D: The Policy 
Debate” Table 58,1998.
 ^See definition at the end o f this chapter.
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<Table I-2> Cases of Bankruptcies in the 30 Largest Chaebols
Chaebol Forms of 
Bankruptcy
Date
Bankrupt
Chaebol Forms of 
Bankruptcy
Date
Bankrupt
Woo-Seong C.A. 96-I-I9 Hanshin C.A. 97-5-31
Dong-Ah S.L. 97-1-10 Kia C.A. 97-7-18
Hanbo C.A. 97-1-28 Dae-Nong S.L. / C.A. 97-9-11
Jinro S.L. / C.A. 97-3-20 Ssang-Bang-UI S.L. / C.A. 97-10-20
Sammi C.A. 97-3-20 Haitai C.A. 97-11-1
Note: 1) S.L. means “Cooperative Syndicated Loans”, which is to give emergency loans for the 
de facto bankrupt firms in the form of syndicated loans by the involved banks. In some 
cases, the initial S.L. led to the C.A. latter. In other words, the cases are often mixed.
2) C.A. means “Court Administration”. Firms that are assessed to be hopeless even with 
cooperative syndicated loans were directly subject to court administration.
3) All firms belong to the 30 Chaebols in terms o f the asset values as o f the end o f 1996, 
assessed by the Bank Supervision Authority o f Korea.
Source: Bank o f Korea, 1999: Quoted in Lee (1999, p. 14).
These series o f large corporate insolvencies inevitably undermined the soundness of 
domestic financial institutions (See Table 1-3). Non-performing loans (NPLs) o f commercial 
banks as o f the end o f 1996 stood at 12.2 trillion ff'on, which is 3.9 percent o f the total credit. 
These bad loans almost doubled to 21.9 trillion IFon in the next nine months to September 1997. 
At the same time, merchant-banking corporations -  whose functions are broadly similar to those 
o f commercial banks -  recorded NPLs o f 3.9 trillion fFbn at the end of September 1997, three 
times larger than the 1.3 trillion ff^on recorded at the end of 1996.
<Table 1-3 > Non-performing Loans in Korean Financial Institutions
(trillion fFon, percent )
1996 Jun. 1997 Sep. 1997
Commercial Banks 12.2 19.2 21.9
(3.9) (5.8) (6.4)
Merchant Banking Corporations 1.3 3.6 3.9
N/A N/A (2.9)
Total 13.5 22.8 25.8
Note: end o f period, figures in parentheses indicates ratios to total credit.
Source: Bank o f Korea, 1998. p.20-2l
These massive corporate bankruptcies, followed by the domestic financial institutions’ 
insolvency problems, severely undermined international investors’ confidence. Moreover, Korea 
was a victim o f a financial epidemic originating from Southeast Asia, as the financial crisis in 
Thailand and Indonesia shifted the negative market sentiment on to other Asian economies. This 
financial crisis in Thailand and Indonesia made international bankers and investors more closely 
examine any potential risks in Asian markets. In Korea, Ahn (1999) argues that (besides an 
aggravated corporate profitability and liquidity squeeze) international bankers and investors 
found a lack o f transparency in foreign debt and foreign exchange reserve situations as well as 
unreliable corporate accounting standards and disclosure practices. These weaknesses were well 
known to international bankers and investors even before the crisis, but were overlooked in their 
belief that Korean Chaebols and banks would not go bankrupt. Nam et al (1999) argue that a 
sudden shift in international creditors confidence in Korean firms and financial institutions 
occurred, prompting these investors to leave the market by cashing their investment and refusing 
to roll over their short-term lending, which directly triggered the Korean financial crisis (See 
Table 1-4).
<Table I-4> Inflows and Outflows of Foreign Portfolio Investment in Korea
(USS billion)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Inflow 0.7 1.9 8.6 lO.O 12.4 12.6 0.8
Outflow (-) 2.0 5.7 6.6 7.8 8.0 II.8 3.3
Net Inflow 2.7 8.6 2.0 2.2 4.4 0.8 -2.5
Source: Bank o f Korea, Monthly Bulletin, Various years.
Many theories have been offered to explain the causes o f the Asian financial crisis in
1997. Broadly speaking, however, there are two dominant and contrasting streams o f thought
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describing the origin o f the Asian financial crisis. One approach, financial panic theory, focuses 
on external factors — such as the self-fulfilling panic of foreign investors — to interpret the 
cause o f the Asian financial crisis. An alternative explanation, moral hazard^ theory, emphasizes 
internal factors — such as the fundamental weakness of the corporate and banking sectors — to 
portray the origin o f the crisis. Nevertheless, it is important to note that singling out one or two 
causes inadequately explains the financial crisis. Similarly, it is difficult to indicate the relative 
importance o f different crisis causing factors (Lee, 1998). A balanced explanation of the Korean 
financial crisis considers both the sudden reversal o f foreign capital flows (external factor) and 
the subsequent illiquidity o f the corporate sector and financial institutions (internal factor) 
simultaneously since they are deeply inter-related.
The fundamental aspect o f the Korean financial crisis, however, lies in the Chaebol’s 
many moral hazard-driven structural weaknesses, which developed with the Korean economy for 
decades. It is true that international investors’ panicky behavior triggered the financial crisis. 
Nevertheless, without the domestic problem o f moral hazard, the crisis could have been avoided. 
Regardless o f the external circumstances, the economy had a serious moral hazard problem, 
which was potentially vulnerable to any kind o f external shock. In other words, the moral hazard 
was a built-in potential explosive; external circumstances, the irrational panic o f foreign 
investors, lit its fuse.
The purpose o f  this study is, therefore, to argue that the moral hazard-driven structural 
weaknesses o f the Chaebols, which developed with the Korean economy, are the fundamentals 
o f  the Korean financial crisis. Krugman’s (1998) moral hazard approach will provide a 
theoretical background for this study. However, since Krugman’s argument tends to generalize
* See définition at the latter section o f this chapter.
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the cause o f the Asian crisis by focusing too much on moral hazard, this study will attempt to 
examine the unique causes o f the Korean crisis by analyzing the structural weakness o f the 
Chaebol in the context o f moral hazard. Thus this study’s biggest contribution is its holistic 
interpretation of the Korean crisis in the context o f moral hazard. By examining the structural 
weaknesses o f the Chaebol, driven by the moral hazard, this study will demonstrate that 
Chaebols were already on the path to an economic turmoil years before the actual financial crisis 
hit the country. The Chaebols' four moral hazard-driven flaws, which eventually triggered the 
Korean crisis, were: investment inefficiency; high indebtedness; extensive diversification; 
resulting low productivity and profitability.
The central concepts, Chaebol and moral hazard, and the characteristics of the Korean 
Chaebol in comparison to the Japanese Zaibatsu are briefly addressed in the latter section o f this 
chapter. Following the Introduction, Chapter 2 addresses the influence o f political factors on 
Korean economic development in a historical context to reveal the cause o f the financial crisis. 
Chapter 3 reviews the two dominant theories interpreting the Asian financial crisis. By doing so, 
this chapter will show how the moral hazard theory explains the fundamental aspect o f the 
Korean financial crisis. Chapter 4 reviews the moral hazard-driven structural weaknesses o f the 
Korean Chaebol uncovering the fundamental cause o f the Korean financial crisis. Among many 
possible factors, this study focuses on four major problems that many scholars deem significant^. 
This study will prove that these four major problems are caused by moral hazard in the corporate 
sector. Finally, various trends and conclusions drawn firom this study will be summarized in 
Chapter 5.
 ^ For example, see Hwang, I., (2000), "Diversification and Restructuring o f the Korea Business Groups” for the 
extensive diversification strategy of the Chaebol.
Before addressing the two central concepts and characteristics o f the Chaebol in 
comparison to the Japanese Zaibatsu, a key limitation o f this study must be acknowledged. Due 
to the complexity o f the Asian financial crisis, it is difficult to find a general explanatory theory. 
Obviously, each affected Asian country uniquely faced the crisis because o f  their different 
economic situations^. This study, however, concentrates on the internal problems o f the 
Chaebol; if I were to extend my analysis, it would be useful to look at the structure and 
efficiency of the Chaebol in a comparative context, while this study provides some comparative 
data -  specifically, an International Comparison of the Average Debt/Equity Ratios -  more 
comprehensive relative data (including a wider range o f Chaebol's efficiency indicators in a 
comparison to other countries’ business corporations) would be required for such research. This 
is an area for further study. Instead of trying to find a general cause (or causes) o f the Asian 
financial crisis, this thesis descriptively focuses on Korea, revealing the country’s unique causes 
o f the crisis. My conclusion is, therefore, restricted to the Korean context.
" For example, Thailand incurred a USS 144 billion trade deficit before the crisis, while Taiwan recorded a USS 100 
billion trade surplus during the same period. In terms of the impact o f the crisis, Indonesia’s aimual real GDP 
growth rate was negative 15.0 percent in 1998, while Singapore recorded 0.0 percent real GDP growth in the same 
year. Besides, although the crisis hit almost every country in the region, not all Asian countries were affected by the 
crisis. Regarding the aimual average growth rate of real GDP of China and Taiwan, they were hardly affected by the 
crisis. China and Taiwan’s real GDP growth rate was 5.5 and 5.0 percent respectfully in 1998 (Asian Development 
Bank, 1999).
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1.2 Conceptual Framework 
Chaebol
In the academic arena, several definitions of Chaebol are available. Kang (1995, p3) 
defines Chaebol as “a group of firms that has emerged during rapid economic development, 
which is largely controlled by the owner and the family members, and is working in many 
diversified business areas.” Similarly, Kim (1997, p5l) defines Chaebol as “family-owned and 
family-managed large business groups, which formed a tight alliance with the Korean 
government and spearheaded its rapid economic growth based on exports.” Jones and Sakong 
(1980) define Chaebol as a family-controlled organization managed centrally through a holding 
company. The organization is a business group managed by the owner and his family with 
business diversification. The business group is heavily dependent on outside money and pursues 
growth through its export drive and its close relations with government. Besides these academic 
definitions, there is a technical meaning o f Chaebol for the purpose o f government regulation 
and empirical studies. According to Lee (1999, p3), the Korean Fair Trade Commissions 
(KFTC) legally define Chaebol as “a group o f companies, more than 30 percent of whose shares 
are owned by some individuals or by companies controlled by those individuals.”
Although the definitions of Chaebol are slightly different from one another, some 
common elements emerge from these various definitions including; large business group 
structures; family control and ownership; diversified management in conduct; and government 
support in environment (Lee, 1999). Therefore, this study will define Chaebol as a large, 
diversified business group that is managed by the owner and his family members, and has grown 
under the active support o f the government. The terms, companies or subsidiaries will be 
interchangeably used to refer to individual firms belonging to a business group, Chaebol.
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Moral Hazard
The term moral hazard originated from the insurance sector. Bannock et al. (1992, p295) 
define moral hazard as “presence o f incentives for individuals to act in ways that incur costs that 
they do not have to bear” which is a typical case for insurance. For instance, once someone has 
insured their house against burglary they do not have the incentive to be careful to protect their 
property. Therefore, the tendency o f insured people to take more risks or use more o f the service 
is the subject o f the moral hazard.
This narrow definition o f moral hazard, according to Leipziger (1998, pi), refers to 
“actions o f economic agents maximizing their own utility to the detriment o f others in situation 
where they do not bear the full consequences o f  their actions because o f uncertainty, incomplete 
information or the nature of the particular contract in force”. Some economists, such as 
Krugman (1998), argue that the Asian financial crisis was led by moral hazard. They argue that 
corporations, financial institutions and foreign investors sought to profit by building, financing or 
serving targeted industries, while believing they were protected by government, at least to some 
extent, from loss^. In the case o f Korea, Chaebols over-invested and domestic/international 
banks over-lent because all assumed that if crisis struck, the government would bail them out. In 
other words, it was believed that Chaebols were always backed by the government due to its 
concern with the socioeconomic impact o f any failure within the big conglomerates. In this 
study, therefore, moral hazard is used to indicate the Chaebols' and domestic/international 
financial institutions’ mind-set that they are somehow protected from loss by governments if 
things go wrong.
’ Corsetti et ai (1998) postulate three different kinds o f strictly interrelated tnoral hazards: corporate, financial and 
international level. For more details, see Corsetti et al, “What caused the Asian currency and financial crisis? Part 
II: The policy debate", 1998.
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1.3 Characteristics of the Chaebol in Comparison to the Japanese Zaibatsu
The Korean Chaebol shared many features with the pre-World War II Japanese Zaibatsu 
model. First, the Chaebol and the Zaibatsu are both family-owned and family-managed. 
Majority shares in the various enterprises are held by the chairman and his immediate relatives. 
Second, their business diversified into a wide range o f unrelated sectors. In Japan, the large 
Zaibatsu were prominent in industrial manufacturing as well as in banking. In Korea, the large 
Chaebol have also diversified into unrelated sectors in manufacturing and service, except banks.
On the other hand, according to Kim (1997), there are two significant differences 
between the Chaebol and the Zaibatsu. First, the Chaebols do not own banks. In Korea, banks 
were nationalised by President Park in 1961, even after privatization in the early 1980s, and the 
Chaebol were prohibited from owning majority share in banks. The nationalisation o f banks in 
Korea by President Park in 1961 assured more room for state intervention in the market, since 
the Chaebol had to rely on the state for domestic loan capital. Unlike the Zaibatsu, therefore, the 
relationship between the government and the Chaebol was vertical rather than equal. Second, 
despite the prohibition o f the Chaebol from owning banks, the government actively supported 
the Chaebol's expansion. The state provided so-called ‘policy loans’ targeted for export firms 
dominated by the large Chaebols. Thus, unlike Japan, the largest share o f  export products is 
manufactured by large companies that are members o f the Chaebol.
In further comparison, according to Kang (1995), the Japanese government usually 
supported the Zaibatsu only after they survived in the severe internal competition o f the free 
market. Thus, the Zaibatsu had already developed high technological and managerial skills 
through internal competitions and had garnered support from the government. In this situation, 
Zaibatsus could be autonomous in their economic ventures even when cooperating with the state.
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II. Korea’s Development Strategy and Chaebols: An Overview
This chapter explores the influence o f political factors on Korean economic development 
in a historical context to reveal the root o f the financial crisis in Korea. Korea’s rapid economic 
development since the 1960s, based on export-oriented industrialization, has been hailed as one 
o f the Third World’s most successful such cases. During 1962-1991, the Korean economy 
expanded an average annual rate o f nearly nine percent (Sakong, 1993). Nominal per capita 
GNP during the period grew from USS 87in 1962 to USS 6,498 in 1991, with real per capita 
GNP increasing nearly eightfold (See Table II-1). At the same time, the proportion o f GDP 
originating from the mining and manufacturing sectors increased from 16.4 percent in 1962 to 
27.9 percent in 1991. Commodity exports rose from USS 54.8 million in 1961 to USS 71.9 
billion in 1991, making Korea one o f the world’s major trading partners.
<Table II-1> Economic Structure of Korea, 1962-1991
1962 1972 1977 1987 1991
GNP (Current USS Billion) 2.3 10.7 36.8 128.9 280.9
Per capita income
Current USS 87 319 1,012 3,110 6,498
Thousands o f Korean fVon* 423 850 1,269 2,403 3,273
Export
Percentage o f GNP 2.4 15.0 27.2 36.7 25.6
Millions o f current USS) 54.8 1,624.1 10,046.5 47,280.9 71,870.1
Import
Percentage o f GNP 18.3 23.6 29.4 31.8 29.0
Millions o f  current USS 421.8 2,522.0 10,810.5 41,019.8 81,524.9
Industrial Structure (%)
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 37.0 26.8 22.4 10.5 8.1
Mining and manufacturing 16.4 23.5 28.9 33.0 27.9
Other 46.6 49.7 48.7 56.5 64.0
Unemployment (%) 8.2 4.5 3.8 3.1 2.6
Note: * 1985 constant
Source: Bank o f  Korea, “Economic
(1993, p.8).
Statistics Yearbook”, various years: Quoted in Saknog 
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This rapid industrialization o f Korea during the last three decades was primarily due to 
strong authoritarian government intervention in business activities through planning the 
country’s economic direction, selecting strategic Industries, and allocating/distributing capital. 
This strong government intervention in the private sector, however, created a close govemment- 
business relationship, which eventually caused the moral hazard problem in the Korean 
economy.
Recent Korean government development strategy has favoured the expansion of a few 
large Chaebols. The government’s price control and exchange rate control, allocation of foreign 
capital to some large export-oriented companies with low interest rates, and special favours and 
subsidies for businesses, together with the high rate o f chronic internal inflation, increased the 
fortune o f a few large Chaebols (Kim, 1997). In this way, the government played the dominant 
role in promoting economic venture in the business sector, while private enterprises expanded 
their wealth rapidly under the government’s favour and subsidies.
The development process o f the Korean economy, therefore, cannot be explained without 
understanding the development policy of the government in relation to the Chaebol. In light o f 
this situation, it is meaningful to divide the period o f Chaebol development process according to 
the change in political regimes. The development processes o f Chaebol can be divided into four 
periods: the Korean emancipation to the end o f Second Republic (1945-1961); the military coup 
in 1961 to the end o f the Third Republic (1961-1972); the Yushin government (1972-1979); 
finally the Fifth Republic (1980-1987). In addition, the financial liberalisation o f  Korea in the 
1990s will be briefly addressed in the latter section o f this chapter.
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2.1 Rhee’s Regime -  The First and Second Republic (1945-1961)
Korea has been involved in the world economy since the country’s emancipation from 
Japanese colonial rule in 1945. However, real industrial development began after the Korean 
War (1950-1953). During 1953-1957, for example, GNP in real terms grew at about 5 percent 
per year (Jones and Sakong, 1980). In this period, foreign aid from the West (especially from the 
U.S.) was an important source o f funds for the reconstruction and rehabilitation o f the economy. 
For example, more than 70 percent o f imports were financed by foreign aid during the 
reconstruction period o f 1953-1960, indicating how dependent the Korean economy was on 
foreign aid (Sakong, 1993).
Through the reconstruction boom in this period, many of the current Chaebols 
accumulated capital. Among the 50 largest Chaebols ranked by sales in 1984, 70 percent (35 
Chaebols) were established during 1945-1960 (See Table II-2).
<Table II-2> Year of Establishment of the 50 Largest Chaebols in 1984
-1945 1946-1960 1961-1971 1972-1979 1980-1984
Top 10 1 8 I 0 0
Top 11-20 2 5 2 1 0
Top 21-30 I 9 0 0 0
Top 31-40 I 6 3 0 0
Top 41-50 0 7 2 1 0
Total 5 35 8 2 0
Source; Daily Economic Newspaper Co. 1986: Quoted in Kim (1997, p.24).
In this period, a group o f  entrepreneurs rapidly grew up as large capitalists, with both political
favors and government subsidies, by increasing their connections with some powerful
bureaucrats and/or politicians rather than investing in the development o f  productive industries.
The role o f government remained essentially a mechanism to create a few large entrepreneurs
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who accumulated capital with illicit fortune by gaining more political favours and subsidies. 
Therefore, the close relationship o f these large capitalists with the government was one o f the 
most important sources for early capital accumulation. This paved the way towards the rise o f 
first top 10 Chaebols during the 1950s (Jones and Sakong, 1980).
In summary, throughout this period, social stability mostly rested on foreign aid. At the 
same time, the government played an important role in the initiation and development o f modem 
entrepreneurial elites (or capitalists) by arranging and distributing resources in the form of 
foreign aid from the West, especially from the U.S. Given the government’s lack o f focus 
toward economic activities, the Chaebol had relative freedom in their economic activities as long 
as they had familiar connections with government officials. Thus, from the initial period of 
Korean industrialization in the 1950s, the development o f Chaebols depended highly on their 
connection with politicians and/or government bureaucrats.
2.2 Park’s Regime -  The Third Republic (1961-1972)
The govemment-business relationship entered into a new era after the military coup on 
May 16, 1961. The passage o f ‘A Law for dealing with Illicit Wealth Accumulation’ prescribed 
the further relationship between the government and Chaebols in the 1960s (Jones and Sakong, 
1980). Park’s regime demonstrated its power to the private sector with charges o f illicit 
accumulation o f wealth. As a result, most former Chaebol founders were arrested and threatened 
with confiscation o f their assets. These charges were meant to bring a clean sweep o f both the 
government and the businesses. According to Kim (1997), however, the basic pattern o f close 
govemment-business relationships was set at this time, and the business community was 
subordinated to the government through the 1960s and thereafter.
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In Park’s regime, one o f  the most important means o f  controlling the business sector was 
financial monopolization. Monopolization o f  domestic capital was achieved by nationalizing all 
Korean private banks in October 1961. Kim (1997) argues that these nationalized banks were 
used by the Park government as a carrot to attract private businesses to conform to the state’s 
directives in the economy and as a stick to punish those that did not follow by threatening a 
withdrawal o f capital assistance. So-called ‘policy loans’ were offered to Chaebols at an interest 
rate substantially lower than regular banks loans (See Table 11-3).
<Table Il-3> Major Interest Rates on Loans and Discounts of the Commercial Banks
(percent per annum)
Elective Year Discount on Bills Loans for Exports Loans on Other Bills
1964 14.0 8.0 16.0
1965 24.0 6.5 26.0
1967 24.0 6.0 26.0
1968 26.0 6.0 25.2
1971 22.0 6.0 22.0-23.0
1972 15.0 6.0 15.5-16.5
1974 15.5 9.0 15.5
1976 17.0-18.0 8.0 17.0-19.0
1978 18.5-19.0 9.0 18.5-20.5
1981 16.5-20.5 15.0 16.5-22.5
1982 10.0 lO.O 100
1983 10.0-11.5 lO.O 10.0-11.5
1984 10.0-11.5 10.0 10.0-11.5
1985 10.0-11.5 10.0 10.0-13.0
Source: Economic Statistics Yearbook, Bank o f Korea: Quoted in Sakong (1993, p.34).
Foreign capital, the most important source o f capital in the 1960s, was also put under the
government’s strict control. Since there was very little accumulation o f domestic capital, it was
necessary to borrow capital from other countries to pursue economic development. However,
the government sought foreign capital in which the responsibility o f distribution and
management was in the hands o f the borrower. Thus, the government’s financial monopolization
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established a centrally managed and powerful set o f instruments to carry out the government’s 
industrialization policies.
In the 1960s, the economy took off due to the government’s efforts to earn public support 
and political legitimacy by promoting economic development via an export-led growth strategy. 
The government believed that developing an outward-oriented economy, with growth as the top 
priority, would not only promote growth but also lay the foundation for enhancing equity and a 
faired income distribution. The government also believed that export-led growth and 
industrialization, financed by foreign debt, would eventually generate a debt-serving capability 
in the economy and stimulate domestic savings (Amsden, 1989). To achieve export growth, the 
government initially financed the necessary funds required for the increase o f exports. While 
promoting the use o f foreign capital, an export orientation included many specific policies, such 
as the devaluation o f the Korean the reduction o f tariffs on inputs used for manufacturing 
exports, and other forms of export subsidies (Yoo and Moon, 1999).
The rise and fall o f Chaebols in the 1960s was, however, still decided in large part by 
political connections, because the state intervened in business activities through arrangement of 
projects, allocation o f foreign capital and monopolization o f domestic financial institutions. Kim 
(1997) argues that the government’s economic policy in this period was oriented to reduce risks 
by decreasing any internal competition and supporting large government-favoured entrepreneurs. 
In this situation, most large Chaebols depended more on the political game by connecting with 
powerful politicians or bureaucrats. Even though the Korean economy recorded rapid economic 
growth and industrialization in the 1960s, the financial dependence o f Chaebols on the 
government increased (Kim, 1997). Conclusively, the fundamental relationships between 
govenunent and Chaebol were not changed from the previous regime.
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2.3 Park’s Yushin Regime -  The Fourth Republic (1972-1979)
In the early 1970s, the government thought it imperative to develop the heavy and 
chemical industries (HCls), including the iron and steel, non-ferrous metal, shipbuilding, general 
machinery, chemical and electronic industries. Several internal and external factors contributed 
to this change in perspective (Sakong, 1993). As an external factor, the declaration o f the Nixon 
Doctrine* toward the end o f the Vietnam War compelled nations like Korea to re-evaluate the 
development o f a defense industry. Under these circumstances, the government thought that 
promoting the HCls would strengthen Korea’s defense capability and upgrade its industrial 
structure.
Internally, Korea’s comparative advantage in light industries declined sharply as the 
industrialized nations raised protective barriers against light-manufactured goods and services 
from developing countries. The HCl policy was, therefore, designed to build a self-sufficient 
economy to cope with the intensified trade protectionism o f the developed countries. In addition, 
domestic political conditions also changed in the early 1970s giving President Park additional 
rationale for promoting HCl (Kim, 1997). Park won a narrow victory against a leading 
opposition leader in the 1971 presidential election. This precarious victory, amid rumours o f 
extensive vote-buying, caused Park to announce the Yushin Reformation in October 1972, 
changing the constitution to allow himself a life-term presidency. To earn public support and 
appease the public prior to the promulgation o f the draconian Yushin Reformation, Park 
announced the economic goals to be achieved by 1981 as “GNP per capita o f US $1,000, and US
 ^ International geopolitical conditions changed when President Richard Nixon o f the U.S. made an announcement 
regarding the defense o f the Pacific during his visit to the Guam Islands in 1969 and with the defeat of the U.S. in 
the Vietnam War. President Nixon aimounced that the defense of the Pacific must lie in the hands of the people in 
the Pacific and declared that U.S. troops would gradually be withdrawn &om various bases in Asia, including Korea. 
(Kim, 1997)
17
$10 billion in export.” (Kim, 1997, pl40). Once again, this was another attempt to earn public 
support and political legitimacy with economic delivery, as in the aftermath o f the 1961 military 
coup. In January 1973, President Park urgently called for the development o f the nation’s heavy 
and chemical industries. However, the private sector was not capable o f investing in the HCls 
due to the lack o f the capital and technology and thus Korean firms could not join the HCl policy 
without the government’s strong support. The government presented, therefore, various 
advantages for large companies to join the HCl policy through preferred support given by the 
tax, trade and credit policies. Due to the state’s strong and concerted support, manufacturing 
investment during the late 1970s was predominantly directed to HCls (See Table II-4).
<Table II-4> Investment by Heavy and Light Industries, 1976-79
(as a share o f total investment)
1976 1977 1978 1979
Light Industries 25.8 24.6 17.5 18.1
Heavy Industries 74.2 75.4 82.5 81.9
Source: Korea Development Institute, 1981: Quoted in Sakong (1993, p.58)
With the government’s support, many Chaebols invested a massive amount of capital to
HCls, which caused the massive concentration o f wealth and the growth o f the Chaebol. Table
II-5 and Table II-6 show a great deal o f business expansion o f large Chaebols in the 1970.
According to the Table H-6, among the 191 subsidiaries o f  the top 10 Chaebols, excluding the IS
missing cases, 114 were established or incorporated during the 1970s while only 34 were
established or incorporated in the 1960s and only 20 were established or incorporated before
1960. Furthermore, although most o f the top 10 Chaebols except Daewoo were established
before 1960, they were able to develop rapidly during the 1970s following the government’s HCl
policy. However, not all the Chaebols could grow dramatically. According to Jones and Sakong
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(1980), seven o f the top 10 Chaebols in the mid-1970s ranked by sales were new ones compared 
with those o f mid-1960s. In other words, many o f the previous Chaebols that could not follow 
with the new government’s development plan were excluded from the chance to grow more.
<Table II-5> Basic Indicators of thelO Largest Chaebols, 1971-1980
Chaebol Foundation Total Assets Average Annual Growth Rate
Year 1971 1980 of Total Assets (%)
Hyundai 1947 158,261 2,874,114 38.0
Samsung 1951 415,978 1,901,127 18.4
Lucky-Gold Star 1947 437,060 1,825,429 17.2
Daewoo 1967 34,679 1,663,400 53.7
Ssangyong 1954 310,424 1,255,876 16.8
Hanjin 1945 83,734 1,085,337 32.9
Kukje 1949 153,489 772,993 19.3
Dae Lim 1939 64,522 748,795 31.8
Korea Explosives 1952 256,424 695,363 11.7
Sunkyong 1953 40,049 666,359 36.7
Note: 1. Rank order based on total assets in 1980.
2. Foundation year o f mother firm.
3. Total assets in 1980 constant Korean million Won. 
Source: Kim, 1997 p.l53.
<Table II-6> Year of EsiauUshment of Subsidiaries of the 10 Largest Chaebols in 1984
Chaebols Total -1949 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-84 Missing
Samsung 30 1 3 6 11 8 1
Hyundai 32 I 2 4 20 1 4
Lucky-Gold Star 24 1 2 5 10 3 3
Daewoo 24 0 0 0 21 3 0
Sunkyung 14 0 I I 7 3 2
Ssangyong 14 2 1 3 6 2 0
Korea Explosives 18 0 I 5 8 3 1
Kukje 18 I 0 0 13 0 4
Hanjin 12 I 0 5 7 0 0
Hyosung 20 I 2 5 12 0 0
Total 191* 8 12 34 114 23 15
Note: * Missing 15 subsidiaries were excluded from the total. 
Source: Hankook Newspaper Co. 1985 p.343.
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However, such disproportionate incentives -  along with over-optimistic assumptions 
regarding world trade prospects -  led to excessive investment in some industries (Kim, 1997). 
In addition to creating inefficiencies in investment, the HCl promotion policy gave rise to serious 
sectoral imbalances. As the government-favoured HCl projects preempted limited financial 
resources, credit to other industries -  such as light manufacturing -  was dramatically squeezed.
In summary, fi-om 1973 to 1979, the government was deeply involved in the allocation of 
resources to promote the development o f specific industries. The government policy o f long­
term economic planning with the aggressive entrepreneurship o f the Chaebol transformed the 
Korean industrial structure and secured the dominant position o f the Chaebol. Moreover, because 
o f huge capital requirement and weak business position o f small and medium-seized firms, the 
new HCl projects were granted exclusively to large Chaebols, contributing to the concentration 
o f economic power among a few large business conglomerates.
2.4 Chun’s Regime -  The Fifth Republic (1980-1987)
The political turmoil o f Korea from the assassination o f President Park in 1979 resolved 
with the emergence o f the Fifth Republic. In 1980 the Korean economy was faced with some 
serious problems that had their origin in external factors as well as certain past industrial 
policies. First, a worldwide recession following the second oil shock in 1979 harshly affected 
the state. Second, the country suffered from domestic inflation and political instability following 
President Park’s assassination. Finally, according to Amsden (1989), industrialized countries 
began to lose their comparative advantage in many o f their traditional manufacturing industries 
and grew more protectionists, while developing countries, such as China, began their rapid 
industrialization, specializing in the production o f low-skilled, labour-intensive items.
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Facing these circumstances, the new government under President Chun adopted several 
stabilization policies (Lee and Yamazawa, 1990). First, the macroeconomic policy implemented 
in 1980 that aimed at stabilizing inflation, galloping at an average annual rate o f 19.7 percent 
measured in terms o f the whole price index. Second, policy involved a structural readjustment o f 
the heavy and chemical industries. Due to overlapping and excessive investments in the 1970s 
and a lack o f demand caused by the world recession, most o f the Arms suffered large losses. 
Third, policy introduced to help reshape the economy was a revocation o f the large incentives 
given the HCls in the 1970s. Loans no longer carried preferential rates o f interest. As the last 
four rows o f  Table 11-2 show, the government took steps, abolishing preference loans by 
eliminating interest rate differentials. The forth measure involved the promotion o f market 
competition and the elimination o f various factors inhibiting a competitive environment 
including flnancial liberalization, mitigating the effects o f  excessive concentration o f wealth in 
the Chaebols, and improving the decreasing level o f capital efficiency. At the same time, the 
government diversified its equity shares in all nationwide commercial banks, transferring 
ownership to private hands. Financial services provided by different types o f intermediaries 
were diversified and made increasingly to overlap, while entry barriers into financial markets 
were lowered. Progress was also made in the area o f monetary and credit management as a 
result o f  the relative decline in policy loans and phased interest rate deregulation (Kim, 1997). 
Finally, the fifth measure was the government’s emphasis on the growth o f  the small and 
medium-sized firms. To this end, the government promoted the manufacture o f technology­
intensive or skilled labour-intensive products.
Despite these readjustments policies, the current economic situation made the 
government continue its intervention in business activities. Many large enterprises in the early
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1980s were on the edge o f bankruptcy because o f the unfavorable external and internal economic 
situations. The rapid increase o f labor wages, the over-and-duplicated investment on the HCls, 
the worldwide recession in the early 1980s and increasing foreign debt made many Chaebols 
vulnerable in their international competitions. In order to correct this situation, the government 
intervened and coordinated negotiations among firms for the relinquishing o f project or reduction 
of capacity with mergers in some cases’.
Although the government’s readjustment policies began the process o f institutionalizing 
more efficiency in the corporate sector, the government failed to eliminate the state’s implicit 
guarantee to the Chaebol. The government cushioned the industry so that if the Chaebol needed 
help, the government was there to rescue. It was thus the state guarantor o f private debt, thereby 
underwriting risk. This guarantee led to the strong belief in Korea that the state would insure 
their survival, because the Chaebols were “too big to fail”. In other words, the country could not 
help adverting the moral hazard problem in the corporate/financial sector even after the massive 
economic reform in the early 1980s.
One critical question may be asked at this point. If the moral hazard is the cause o f the 
Korean financial crisis, why did the crisis not occur until 1997? Since the moral hazard o f  the 
country had existed for decades, it could have happened anytime, including this readjustment 
period. According to Click (1998), rapid economic growth masked much o f the extent o f  risky 
lending and the structural weaknesses o f the corporate/financial sector. Financial liberalization
 ^ There were two more rounds of massive industrial restructuring and bailouts in the 1980s. One was the 
restructuring o f two ailing industries in the mid-1980s; overseas construction and shipping. The restructuring 
packages included mergers, capacity reduction, debt rescheduling and ftesh bank loans. The other industry 
rationalization was made under the Industrial Development Law of 1986 involving such industries as automobiles, 
diesel engines, heavy electrical equipment, heavy construction equipment, textiles and shoes. Included in the 
rationalization packages were inducement of specialization, capacity reduction, long-term supply contracts together 
with such financial support as long-term loans at subsidized interest rates, loans loss compensation and debt write­
offs. About lialf o f ilie coumiercial bank loss was replenished by subsidized central bank loans (Lee, 1999).
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in the 1990s, therefore, should be seen as having exacerbated the structural weaknesses o f Asian 
economies and increased their vulnerability to a critical level. Through the 1990s financial 
liberalization, Korea was much more closely integrated with world financial markets in the 
1990s than they had been in the 1980s, so that the country’s susceptibility to changes in market 
sentiment increased'®. What is different is that international funds flow much more easily to the 
country because o f the liberalization o f the financial market. Closer integration with world 
financial market adds additional dimensions o f vulnerability that are not present in a closed 
economy such as China (Moreno et al, 1998). Thus domestic financial liberalization and the 
increased volume and volatility o f international capital flows combined to exacerbate structural 
weaknesses arising from moral hazard in under-regulated Asian financial market (Click, 1998).
From the late 1980s, Kim (1997) argues that the businesses surpassed the government in 
certain technological areas and no longer need government subsidies to survive. The 
government lost its bargaining power when the Chaebol found other ways to raise capital 
investment. The government was able to make credible demands on the Chaebol when it was 
the sole dispenser and distributor o f credit. However, Korean conglomerates had alternative 
investment methods to line up credit and raise capital through bond or stock offering. As a 
result, the government was weakened in its ability to control the private sector from the late 
1980s.
In summary, modem Korean industries and entrepreneurial elites could accumulate 
capital by industrial monopolization under the state’s protection. They established industrial 
bases during the 1950s and 1960s by foreign aid and foreign borrowings, and expanded their 
wealth rapidly during the 1970s under the government HCl development plan. Moreover, the
Kuteau llimucml libcralizalion in ihe 1990s will be addressed in the latter section o f  this chapter.
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direct state intervention in the 1970s and 1980s created moral hazard. In other words, because of 
implicit government guarantees, the Chaebol no longer felt compelled to fulfill their obligations 
to their respective banks. In the financial sector, banks lent to the Chaebol after the state 
guaranteed the loans, instead o f fostering an innovative banking industry that applied financial 
tools to evaluate firms, minimize risk and gauge the Chaebols. Banks did not need to use 
complicated tools to evaluate firms when the safest bet was to give loans to state-backed 
Chaebols. Chapter 3 and 4 will cover the moral hazard problem o f the Korean economy as a 
fundamental cause o f the crisis.
2.5 Financial Liberalization in the 1990s
Financial reform in Korea has been progressing on many fronts since the early 1990s. 
This has resulted in many changes and new challenges, particularly in the financial sector.
2.5.1 Interest Rate Liberalization
To bring interest rates more in line with financial markets’ fluctuations, the Korean 
government launched a four-staged interest rate liberalization plan in November 1991 (See Table 
II-7). This plan applies to interest rates on all deposits and loans. The state hoped that the new 
deregulated interest rate would accurately represent the way capital was moving through the 
domestic financial market; in this way it aimed to promote the efficient distribution o f capital 
and improve the competitiveness o f the financial sector (Bank o f Korea, 1994). However, 
liberalization o f interest rates does not guarantee efficient capital distribution. Rather, there have 
to be other institutional settings for a rational decision-making process. It is now apparent that 
while the government made gradual gains in interest rate liberalization, it continued to direct the
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nation’s commercial banks and other financial institutions toward making investment in certain 
strategic industries that would latter prove to be inefficient (Haggard and Mo, 2000).
<Table II-7> Interest Rate Liberalization
Stage Lending Rates Deposit Rates Bond Issue Rates Objects
1"
November
1991
- Bank overdraws and 
discounts on commercial 
bills, apart from loans 
assisted by BOK* 
rediscounts
• Discounts on commercial 
paper and trade bills of 
investments and finance 
companies, etc
- Overdue loans
- Short-term, large 
denomination deposit 
instruments such as 
certificates of deposit, 
trade bills, commercial 
paper and repurchase 
agreements
- Long-term time deposits 
and money-in-trust with a 
maturity of at least 3 years
- Corporate bonds with a maturity of 
at least 2 years
2nd
November
1993
- All loans of banks and 
non-bank financial 
institutions, apart from those 
provided through 
government or BOK 
rediscounts
- Long-term deposit with a 
maturity o f 2 years or 
more
- Corporate bonds with a maturity of 
less than 2 years and all bank 
debentures
- Monetary stabilization bonds and 
all government and public bonds
3'“
1994-1995
<1994- 1995>
- Loans financed by BOK 
rediscounts such as discount 
bills
<1996>
- Loans with banking funds 
compensated for interest rate 
gap by government funds 
(special equipment loans, 
etc)
- Further deregulation of 
short-term marketable 
products
-> Phasing out regulations 
on issues and matiuities
- Deposit excluding 
demand deposit 
-^Introduction of financial 
products linked to market 
rates
4'*
During
1997
- Setting up plan for 
gradual deregulation of 
demand deposit
- Reviewing an abolition 
of restrictions on short­
term marketable 
instruments
Note: * Bank o f Korea.
Source: Bank o f Korea, 1994 p.5
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2.5.2 Foreign Exchange Liberalization
The Phase III Plan o f foreign exchange liberalization in November 1997 achieved two 
major objectives: First, it brought Korea closer to a free-floating foreign exchange system by 
widening the band at which currency exchange may vary from the standard rate; second, it 
deregulated foreign currency transactions within a preset limit by eliminating documentation 
requirements (See Table II-8). Since adopting a market average exchange rate system in March 
1990, the government had been incrementally widening the foreign exchange fluctuation band 
from 0.4 percent to 1.0 percent in October 1993, to 1.5 percent in November 1994 and finally to 
2.25 percent in December 1995. The Phase III Plan further expanded the band to 10 percent in 
November 1997. This last increase was a defensive response to the extreme destabilization of 
the Korean currency, a situation that was taking the economy toward a financial crisis (Cho, 
1999a).
<Table II-8> Foreign Exchange Liberalization (Phase III Plan)
Stage Starting
Year
Liberalization Contents
1st 1993 - From October I, the daily fluctuation band o f the interbank foreign exchange 
rate will be widened to plus and minus 0.8 percent.
- From July I, the overall foreign exchange oversold position limit will be raised to 30 
percent of the bills bought in the previous month or USS 20 million, whichever is larger, 
from the current 20 percent or USS 10 million limit.
- From July I, firms can hold foreign currency deposits o f up to USS 300 million in 
exchange for won currency without presenting underlying documents, compared with the 
current USS 200 million limit.
- From July I, underlying documentation will be required for all foreign exchange 
forward deals 45 days after signing o f contracts, compared with the current 30 days.
- Import or export settlements in Korean currency up to USS 100 thousand will be 
permissible from October I.
- From October I, non-residents will be permitted to open free won accounts (demand 
deposit accounts).
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2nd 1994-
1995
- The daily fluctuation band of interbank rates will be further expanded.
- Criteria for monitoring foreign exchange position o f banks will be shifted from 
controlling only the overbought position to weighing both the overbought position and 
capital size.
• The limit for oversold spot FX position will be readjusted after taking into 
consideration the development o f the foreign exchange market.
• Underlying documentation requirements for foreign exchange forward contracts will 
continue to be softened so that both industrial and financial institutions will be fully 
responsible for their own exchange risks.
- A full exemption on underlying documentation requirements for foreign exchange 
forward contracts between foreign currencies ( 1994).
- Firms can hold foreign currency deposits without limit in exchange for won currency 
without presenting underlying documentations (1994).
• The scope of exemptions on underlying documentation for forward transactions 
between won and foreign currencies will be widened ( 1994).
- The maximum limit for exports and imports settlement in won will be raised beyond 
USS 100 thousand.
3rd 1996-
1997
• To pursue the establishment of a free-floating foreign exchange rate system as used by 
advanced countries.
- Focus on foreign exchange position management will be shifted from monitoring 
exchange market to promoting sound business managements of foreign exchange banks.
- Underlying documentation requirements for normal and ordinary transactions will be 
waived but the principle of real demand use in foreign exchange forward contracts will 
be maintained.
- Invisible trade, in addition to visible trade, will be permitted to be settled in the won 
currency on a step-by-step basis.
Source: he Korea imes, June 30,1993 p.9.
2.5.3 Capital Account Liberalization
In 1981, the government announced a long term plan that would open the nation’s 
securities markets to foreigners. As a first step, onshore investment trust funds (exclusive to 
foreign investors) were established to provide opportimities to invest in Korean securities (The 
Korea Times, June 30, 1993). In 1991, the Korean stock exchange began allowing membership 
to foreign securities houses, and on January 3, 1992, the Korean stock market was opened to 
direct foreign investment with certain restrictions: a ceiling o f 10 percent on the aggregate 
foreign positions in any class o f shares o f a company, and a ceiling o f  3 percent for a single 
foreign investor.
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These ceilings were raised in June 1993 with phase III o f  the capital market liberalization 
plan (See Table 11-9), launched as part o f the government’s blueprint for financial market 
liberalization. As well as opening its own markets to foreign investors, Korea paved the way for 
domestic investors to invest directly in foreign securities in 1994. Beginning with Sammi Steel 
Corporation’s overseas bonds with warrants in November 1989, and Samsung Corporation’s 
overseas depositary receipts in December 1990, listed companies in Korea began actively 
working towards global securitization. In May 1998, the Korean equity and debt securities 
markets were further liberalized with the elimination o f ceilings on foreign positions and the 
opening of the short-term debt securities markets to foreign investors.
Capital accounts liberalization in a broad sense refers to any action that releases or 
removes legal obstacles laid upon the international movement o f capital. The most common first 
step to capital accounts liberalization is the opening o f the domestic securities market to foreign 
investors. From this initial step, cross-border transactions o f assets with maturities o f one year 
and over are liberalized. In the advanced stages, the short-term assets market is open. Capital 
liberalization is complete when deregulation extends beyond the asset markets to direct 
investments, real estate, non-securitized rights, credits related to international trade, financial 
collateral and insurance, foreign currencies, savings accounts transaction, life insurance and 
similar financial transactions (Cho, 1999a).
In Korea, large banks were able to raise short-term fimds from overseas under an 
arrangement that gave them a virtual monopoly on foreign commercial loans. The resulting 
unhedged exposure to foreign exchange volatility left the economy highly vulnerable to the 
liquidity crunch that arrived in late 1997. The Korean government has since been condemned for 
its loose supervision o f domestic banks and their portfolio structure.
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<Table II-9> Capital Accounts Liberalization (Phase III Plan)
Stage Starting
Year
Liberalization Contents
1st 1993 (Direct Investment)
- The notification system for direct foreign investment in Korea has been adopted in principle.
- The pre-notice plan for opening o f  domestic industries to direct foreign investments was announced.
- Korean firms will enjoy simplication o f  application procedures and easing o f  restrictions for overseas 
direct investments.
(Outbound Portfolio Investment)
- Both the scope o f  institutional investors and their investment limits will be expanded or raised. From 
October I , securities and insurance companies will be permitted to expand their overseas portfolio 
investment ceiling to USS 100-200 million, compared with the current limit o f  USS 50-100 million.
- Individual investors will be able to make indirect portfolio investment overseas through investment trust 
companies and their investment ceiling will be expanded as demand increases.
(Inbound Portfolio Investment)
- From August I , the cument 10 percent foreign ownership ceiling will not be applied to joint venture 
listed companies in which foreigners control more than 50 percent o f  the equities. But prior consent from 
these companies is required.
(Overseas Fund Raising by Firms in Korea)
- The notification system has already replaced the prior approval system. For Korean companies seeking 
to raise overseas capital through issuance o f  equity linked bonds including convertible bonds, bonds with 
warrants and depositary receipt.
- The deferred payment period for imports o f raw materials for export purposes has already been extended 
to 120 days from the previous 90 days.
- From July I, foreign firms or joint venture hi-tech services companies will be permitted to introduce 
offshore short-term capital. Foreign hi-tech manufacturing companies have already been given access to 
offshore short-term capital.
2nd 1994-
1995
(Direct Investment)
- In accordance with the pre-notification plan for opening direct foreign investment in Korea, the scope of 
industrial sectors eligible for foreign investment will be expanded and the investment procedures will be 
simplified.
- Projects eligible for notification to the government for investing overseas will be expanded.
(Outbound Portfolio Investment)
- Institutional investors will be given full freedom in investing in offshore bonds and equities.
- The scope o f  the allowable limit for individual investors to invest in overseas bonds and equities will be 
expanded.
(Inbound Stock Investment)
- The foreign stock ownership ceiling in Korean stocks will be raised.
- Foreigners, who have stayed in Korea for more than six months but are defined under the Securities 
Exchange Act as foreigners, will be given national treatment for Korean stock investment (1994).
(Bond Market-Opening)
- International organizations such as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank will be authorized to 
issue won-denominated bonds in Korea (1995).
- Foreigners will be authorized to invest directly in equity-linked bonds and convertible bonds issued by 
sm all-and medium-sized companies (1994).
- Foreigners will be allowed to underwrite government and public bonds o f  which yields are similar to 
international rates (1994).
- Foreign firms will be able to invest in bond-type beneficiary certificates as a  way o f  indirectly opening 
the domestic bond market (1995).
(Overseas Fund-Raising By Firms in Korea)
- Foreign firms o f  jo in t venture general manufacturing companies will be allowed to introduce offshore 
short-term capital.
-  The period for imports on a  deferred payment basis will be further extended.__________________________
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(Direct Investment)
- The notification system for direct foreign investments in Korea will be widely implemented.
- The notification system will be introduced to liberalize overseas direct investments by Korean 
companies.
(Inbound Stock Investment)
- The foreign stock investment limit will be raised again.
(Bond Market Opening)
- Foreigners will be authorized to invest directly in non-guaranteed long-term bonds issued by small- and 
medium-sized companies (1997).
(Access to Foreign Capital)
- In keeping with the maturity o f  macroeconomic conditions including balance o f  payments equilibrium 
and narrowing o f  interest rate differentials between domestic and international markets, imports o f 
commercial loans will be authorized and the period for deferred imports will be extended in parallel with 
intemational standards.
(.Additional Opening of Securities Industry)
- Requirements for opening branches by foreign securities companies will be soffened ( 1994).
- Capital requirements for branches o f  foreign securities companies will be lowered from 10-20 billion 
won (1996).
- Foreign credit rating agencies will be able to establish liaison offices in Korea and have equity 
participation in local credit rating agencies (1994).
- Foreigners can expand their equity participation ceiling in Korea investment trust companies and 
investment advisory companies (1995).
- Foreign credit rating agencies can raise their equity participation ceiling in domestic rating companies 
(1996).________________________________________________________________________________________
Source: The Korea Times, June 30,1993 p.9.
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Chapter III. The Origin of the Crisis -  Theoretical Review
Numerous research papers, statements and speeches attempted to decipher the origin of 
the Asian financial crisis. Broadly speaking, however, there are two dominant streams o f 
thoughts explaining the origin o f the crisis in contrasting ways: the 'financial panic’ and the 
moral hazard’ theories. This chapter reviews these two popular theories, and argue that the 
moral hazard theory best interprets the fundamental cause o f the financial crisis in Korea. The 
following sub-section will, therefore, theoretically review these two explanations o f the crisis in 
1997. Finally, this chapter will explain the Korean financial crisis assuming that the moral 
hazard was the fundamental cause o f the crisis.
1. Financial Panic
The financial panic theory argues that the main cause o f the financial crisis was an 
irrational panic among speculative investors. According to Radelet and Sachs (1998a, 1998b), 
for example, there was nothing wrong with the fundamentals o f the Asian economies prior to the 
crisis. The Asian financial crisis was caused not by any weakness o f the Asian countries’ 
economic fundamentals, but by intemational investors’ panicky behaviour; such behaviour 
primarily involved in a sudden shifi in market confidence and disrupted capital flows to Asia 
(Radelet and Sachs, 1998a). In other words, at the core o f the Asian financial crisis were large- 
scale foreign capital inflows into financial system that became vulnerable to panic. Therefore, 
Radelet and Sachs suggest that the structural deficiencies o f the intemational capital market is 
the prominent culprit o f the rapid economic meltdown in East Asia and its spread to the rest o f 
the region, and that the affected countries’ economic fundamentals became vulnerable to extemal 
shock prior to the Asian financial crisis.
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It is true that during the 1990s, many Asian economies enjoyed a drastic increase in 
capital flows compared with the 1980s, resulting from their market opening and good market 
forecast, even though the institutional weaknesses o f these economies were well known for 
decades" (See Table III-l). The volume of capital inflows into the region averaged over 5 
percent o f GDP between 1990 and 1996. Most notably, capital inflows into Thailand and 
Malaysia were equivalent to 13 percent in 1995 and 16.8 percent in 1993 o f those year’s GDPs, 
respectively.
<Table III-1> Capital Flows in Selected Economies prior to the Crisis
(percent o f GDP)
Country 83-89 90-95 90 91 92 93 94 95 96
Korea -0.8 3.0 1.1 2.3 2.3 1.0 2.8 8.5 5.0
Indonesia 4.0 3.9 3.9 4.4 4.4 3.6 2.2 5.1 N/A
Thailand 4.6 10.2 10.7 12.0 8.5 8.4 8.4 13.0 10.7
Malaysia 3.6 9.7 4.2 11.7 15.1 16.8 1.8 8.5 N/A
Philippines 1.2 6.4 4.6 6.4 6.1 6.0 8.0 7.2 N/A
Singapore 4.9 -0.2 10.5 5.4 3.6 -1.9 -16.1 -2.9 0.6
Note: The financial capital flows in this table includes portfolio investment and direct investment 
by the government.
Source: Bank o f Korea, Various years: Quoted in Rhee and Lee (1998, p.9).
This massive capital inflow started to reverse when the Thai Baht plummeted in value 
after the Thai government abandoned its pegged exchange rate, given the country’s huge trade 
deficit in July 1997. According to Bowles (1999), once Thailand was forced to devalue its 
currency, it reinforced intemational investors’ self-fulfilling expectations and made them look 
for ‘similar’ countries. Thus, Bowles argues that countries with fixed exchange rates, low
"  As Corsetti et al. (1998) point out, Asia’s consumption and investment boom might have resulted from the 
region’s overly-optimistic beliefs that the economic expansion would persist unabated in the future. These large 
capital inflows make it easy to Hnance the increasing demand. In such circumstances, Corsetti et al. argue that a 
sudden change in expectations in response to an extemal shock can cause a rapid reversal o f  capital flows and in 
turn trigger a currency crisis.
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foreign exchange reserves, high trade deficits and soaring inflows o f short-term capital were 
potential targets for investor panic and currency flight. As a result, between 1996 and 1997, 
Thailand experienced a sudden reversal o f capital inflows equivalent to approximately 20 percent 
o f that year’s GDP. For the five troubled economies -  Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines 
and Thailand -  net capital inflows plummeted from USS 97 billion to negative USS 12 billion in 
1997. This turnaround of USS 109 billion in a year is equivalent to about 10 percent o f pre-crisis 
GDP of these five countries (Radelet and Sachs, 1998a).
This sudden withdrawal o f foreign capital had significant economic effects in Asia. As 
Radelet and Sachs (1998b) argue, the withdrawal o f foreign credit resulted in a rise in domestic 
interest rates, which in turn led to a tightening o f domestic credit conditions while the nominal 
and real exchange rates sharply depreciated. In the case of Korea, the Won currency dropped in 
value by 50 percent and the domestic interest rate doubled between the end o f 1996 and the end 
of 1997. The real exchange rates depreciation and much higher domestic interest rates led to a 
rapid rise in non-performing loans and a sudden loss o f bank capital in the crisis-hit economies, 
where banks borrowed short-term, unhedged and US dollar denominated loans to finance long 
term domestic investment.
Similarly, Wade and Veneroso (1998) contend that the Asian economies were relatively 
healthy and efficient prior to the crisis. High savings in Asian countries naturally led to high 
debt/equity ratio o f industrial firms, which worked as the engine o f  strong economic growth. 
They argue that Western and Japanese banks and investment houses were responsible for the 
crisis. These intemational bankers, who usually had a powerful incentive to follow the herd, 
ignored their own pmdential limits and lent heavily to Asian companies over the 1990s, 
assuming that high growth would continue and the exchange rate would remain stable.
33
It is one thing, however, to point to the irrational behaviour o f intemational investors as 
the source o f  the problem, and another to argue that the fundamentals of the Asian economy 
were strong prior to the crisis. According to Radelet and Sachs (1998a, 1998b), there was 
nothing wrong with the fundamentals o f the Asian economies prior to the crisis. However, the 
Korean economy was already on the path to a crisis years before the actual financial crisis hit the 
country. The symptoms o f the impending financial crisis in Korea started to appear when the 
economy began to slow down in 1996. As Table IU-2 shows, the current account deficit 
widened from USS 8.5 billion in 1995 to USS 23 billion in 1996. The ratio o f the current 
account balance deficit to GDP rose to 4.7 percent in 1996 from below 2 percent in the two 
preceding years. This widening current account deficit was brought by the deceleration o f export 
growth due to the fall in the prices o f Korea’s major export items, especially computer memory 
chips, coupled with a rapid expansion o f imports, most notably o f capital goods and consumer 
goods, which eventually caused the massive corporate bankruptcy in the early 1997 (Nam et al., 
1999).
<Table III-2> Current Account Balance, 1994-1998
(year on year growth rates, percent)
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Current Account (USS billion) -3 .9 -8.5 -23 -8.2 9.7
Current Account /GDP -1.0 -1.9 -4.7 -1.9 2.1
Source: National Statistical Office: Quoted in Nam et al (1999, p.4).
Radelet and Sachs (1998b) hardly mention the continuous bankruptcies o f  many Korean
Chaebols during the period firom early 1997 to the onset o f the crisis. They also fail to
acknowledge that the Korean banking sector was burdened with huge amounts o f non-
performing loans due to inefficient banking practice even before the financial crisis in the late
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1997. Instead, they argue that exchange rate depreciation, precipitated by sudden withdrawal of 
capital and the improper IMF macroeconomic policies, was the major cause o f the debt problems 
in Korea. To be sure, foreign exchange depreciation and high interest rates since December 
1997 added to the debt burden o f Korean firms. It is also critical to point out that, however, huge 
amounts o f inherited extemal debts, plus additional debts imposed on the banks by the 
unprecedented number o f bankruptcies o f Chaebols since the early of 1997, were important 
causes of the crisis (See Table 111-3). The ratio o f external debts to GNP rose to 21.8 percent in 
1996 from 14.0 percent in 1992, where the major debt holders were financial institutions.
<Table III-3 > External Debts by Sector in Korea
(Unit: USS billion)
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Public Sector 5.6 3.8 3.6 3.0 2.4 18.0
Corporate Sector 13.7 15.6 20.0 26.1 35.6 42.3
Financial Sector 23.5 24.4 33.3 49.3 66.7 60.5
Total 42.8 43.9 56.8 78.4 104.7 120.8
Long-Term 24.3 24.7 26.5 33.1 43.7 69.6
Short-Term 18.5 19.2 30.4 45.3 61.0 51.2
Total/GNP (%) 14.0 13.3 15.1 17.3 21.8 27.5
Source: Cho, 1999a p.20.
As a result, many domestic banks -  such as Seoul Bank and First Bank -  were already close to 
the point o f bankruptcy even before the crisis: this led negotiators firom the IMF and the 
government to decide to liquidate these troubled banks in negotiations leading to the first IMF 
bailout (Yoon, 1998). In this way, Radelet and Sachs see only what happened after the crisis and 
disregard prior events.
Furthermore, Radelet and Sachs argue, "the crisis involved considerable lending to 
debtors that were not protected by state guarantees” (1998b, p5). However, in the case o f Korea,
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all the domestic financial institutions were explicitly and/or implicitly guaranteed by the 
government'": at least financial institutions and foreign investors thought that they were 
protected from possible loss by the government. This moral hazard certainly worked as an 
incentive for foreign banks to make loans excessively to Korean financial institutions. When the 
Hanbo Group collapsed in February 1997, for example, the Secretary o f Economic Affairs 
announced that the Korean government would not guarantee Korean banks' foreign debts. This 
resulted in enormous panic among intemational investors, and the official retracted the statement 
in less than a week (Ahn, 1999).
Wade and Veneroso (1998) seem to agree with Radelet and Sachs that there was nothing 
fundamentally wrong with the Korean economic model. For instance, according to Wade and 
Veneroso, Western commentators who dismiss the system as ‘crony capitalism’, seeing only its 
corruption and favouritism, miss (1998, p7)
"...the financial rationale for cooperative, long-term, reciprocal relations between firms, 
banks and government in a system which intermediates high savings into high corporate 
debt-equity ratios. (They also miss the cronyism o f U.S. capitalism, generated by the 
electoral finance regime.)”
However, according to Yoon (1998), Wade and Veneroso do not recognize that this ‘cooperative, 
long-term, and reciprocal relations between firms, banks and govenunent’ also provided 
politicians and Chaebol owners with the opportunity to seriously distort Korea’s political and
There seem to be a number of studies that back up the Korean government’s explicitly and/or implicitly guarantee 
towards the domestic financial institutions. See Amsden (1989), “Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and late 
Industrialization”, New York: Oxford University Press as well as Roubini (1999), "What caused Asia's Economic 
and Curreucy Crisis and Its Global Contagion? " for more details.
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economic structure. The slush fund scandals of former presidents Chun and Roh, and the Hanbo 
collapse, vividly show how seemingly benign trilateral relations could be turned into ugly 
relations. This moral hazard phenomenon was nothing but the mirror image of these 
'cooperative, long-term, and reciprocal relations’.
In summary, from the perspective of the financial panic theory, the region’s economies 
were inherently sound and could have continued functioning well, but an arbitrary shift in market 
expectations that interrupted capital flows to Asia triggered the financial crisis in 1997. To be 
sure, the financial crisis was triggered by the investors’ irrational panic. However, given the 
empirical evidence above, it is hard to believe that the fundamentals o f the Korean economy 
were sound. The economy was already on the path to a crisis years before the actual financial 
crisis hit the country. The economy suffered from a string o f major corporate bankruptcies 
followed by unbearable burden of non-performing loans in the financial sector, which in turn, 
greatly undermined intemational confidence and hence caused a massive pullout by foreign 
investors from the country.
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2. Moral Hazard
An alternative explanation, which this study favours, emphasizes internal factors as the 
cause o f  the East Asian economic crisis. This hypothesis focuses on the moral hazard problem in 
the debtor countries' financial and industrial sectors as having the leading role in the crisis. For 
instance, Krugman argues (1998, p3)
‘The problem began with financial intermediaries -  institutions whose liabilities were 
perceived as having an implicit government guarantee, but were essentially unregulated 
and therefore subject to severe moral hazard problems. The excessive risky lending of 
these institutions created -  inflation not o f goods but o f asset prices. The overpricing of 
assets was sustained in part by a sort o f circular process, in which the proliferation of 
risky lending drove up the prices o f risky assets, making the financial condition of the 
intermediaries seem sounder than it was."
This interpretation emphasises the role that governmental guaranties played in the birth of 
the crisis, through moral hazard. According to this approach, the loans borrowed by domestic 
banks from abroad are supported by government. The banks, whose obligations are guaranteed, 
like “investments that could yield high returns if  it gets lucky, even if  there is also strong 
possibility o f heavy losses” (Krugman, 1998, p4). That is, foreign capital deviates towards less 
efficient and riskier projects than those the projects non-guaranteed intermediaries would invest 
it in. On the other hand, according to Krugman (1998), moral hazard leads to over-investment. 
When granting a loan, guaranteed intermediaries do not consider the expected profitability o f the 
project but the highest profitability possible for such project (so-called ‘pangloss value’), so for
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these intermediaries there are more profitable projects to invest it (Garcia and Olivie, 1998, pi I). 
This is why investors receiving loans from guaranteed intermediaries will be willing to pay more 
than others for certain assets, thus pushing up the price o f those assets. Roubini (1998) also 
argues that most banks in East Asian economies had been implicitly and explicitly guaranteed by 
governments. Thus, international investors made excessive loans to the banks in East Asian 
countries, which in turn transferred capital to firms involved in risky projects.
In the case o f Korea, it is noteworthy that the number o f firms belonging to the Hanbo 
Group increased while an unsound investment in a steel plant occurred. This means that bank 
loans were diverted for the purpose o f increasing the number o f companies in the group (The 
Joong-Ang Newspaper, February 3, 1997). Most Chaebol owners in Korea would have thought, 
as did Chung Tae-soo (Chairman of the Hanbo Group) that the safest way to avoid collapse 
would be to increase the number and the size o f their companies and take the national economy 
and creditor banks as their own hostages. As Park Young Bae, President o f a commercial bank, 
complained, ‘The attitude o f the Chaebol owners, with the help o f politicians and high-ranking 
bureaucrats in the Ministry o f Finance and Economy (MOFE), would suddenly become arrogant 
when their bank loans exceeded certain levels.” (The Dong-Ah Newspaper, May 16,1997). This 
Chaebol owners' strategy o f taking the national economy hostage usually worked as they 
expected. Even the former deputy prime minister Kang Kyung-sik, who has been known as a 
believer o f market principles, could not let the Chaebols collapse as market mechanisms would 
dictate. After the collapse o f  the Hanbo and the Sammi Groups, his ministry (MOFE) directed 
creditor banks to make an agreement to keep providing additional emergency loans to these 
Chaebols (The Dong-Ah Newspaper, April 23,24, May 19,1997).
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On the other hand, the problem o f moral hazard made regulation o f  the financial system 
lax, which contributed to excessive inflows o f foreign capital and Anally to the occurrence o f the 
currency crisis (Balino and Ubide, 1999). International investors believed that the Korean 
government or the IMF would bail them out if  something went wrong. Thus, they did not feel it 
was necessary to carefully examine the soundness o f Korean firms and financial institutions to 
which they made these excessive loans. Similarly, domestic financial institutions tended to think 
that the government would rescue business firms if  problems arose (Corsetti et al., 1998). They 
had no incentive to be prudent when borrowing from international investors and lending to 
domestic industrial firms. This moral hazard driven situation was worsened by the government, 
to whom the final responsibility of monitoring international financial transactions fell. Cho 
(1999a) argues that this was because the government had no experience o f monitoring 
international capital transactions and providing the financial system with proper safeguard 
measures in order to contain risks while opening market.
Indeed, the moral hazard o f the Korean economy resulted in excessive investment, high 
indebtedness, over diversification and low productivity and profitability o f the corporate sector, 
which eventually caused the financial crisis. These moral hazard driven problems o f the 
Chaebols will be examined in the next chapter.
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IV. Structural Weaknesses of the Chaebol: Cause of the Crisis
This chapter analyses the cause o f the Korean financial crisis, which can be attributed to 
the structural weaknesses o f the Chaebol in the context o f the moral hazard. The moral hazard 
caused high indebtedness, investment inefficiency and extensive diversification resulting low 
productivity and profitability leading to massive bankruptcies o f the Chaebols. This massive 
corporate insolvency problem translated into a domestic financial crisis making the economy 
extremely vulnerable and eventually contributing to the financial crisis. By examining these 
structural weaknesses o f  the Chaebol in the context o f the moral hazard, this chapter will 
demonstrate that these four weaknesses were the fundamental cause o f the crisis. In addition, 
this chapter will try to explain that the Chaebols were already on the path to a crisis years before 
the actual financial crisis hit the country, due to their moral hazard-driven structural weaknesses.
4.1 High Indebtedness
The high exposure to debt financing o f large Korean conglomerates was one o f the most 
critical factors on the path to the financial crisis. In 1997, the gross debt o f  the top 30 Chaebols 
amounted to 357 trillion Won, equivalent to 85 percent o f that year’s GDP (Gobat, 1998). The 
total debt owned by Korean firms amounted to 811 trillion Won, equivalent to 190 percent o f that 
year’s GDP (See Figure IV-1). This debt was also highly concentrated: the top 5 Chaebols 
accounted for roughly two-thirds of the top 30 Chaebols’ debt and 45 percent o f Korea’s 
corporate debt. The financial vulnerability of Korean firms can also be seen from the high 
debt/equity ratios. The average corporate debt/equity ratio in Korea is about 5 times higher than 
that o f Taiwan (See Figure IV-2). By the end of 1997 the average debt/equity ratio o f the 30
largest Chaebols reached 519 percent, about 130 percent points higher than a year earlier.
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<Figure IV-1> Debt/GDP Ratios by Sector
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Source: Bank o f Korea: Quoted in Nam et al (1999, p.6).
<Figure IV-2> International Comparison of Debt/Equity Ratios
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Note: For the manufacturing sector in Korea, Japan and Taiwan.
Source: Bank o f  Korea, Financial Statement Analysis: Quoted in Nam et al (1999, p.6).
Furthermore, Chaebols ' high indebtedness problem was worsened by domestic banks’
excessive exposure to short-term external debt. During 1994-96, Korean firms undertook a
major capacity investment financed mainly through borrowing from domestic financial
institutions. Korean banks met this increased demand for funds by increasingly turning to
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foreign borrowing, often at short maturities (Balino and Ubide, 1999). The share o f short-term 
foreign debt, which amounted to 58 percent o f the total external liability o f Korea in 1995, 
increased to 62 percent in 1996, adding up to US $ 100 billion (Yoo and Moon, 1999). This 
heavy reliance on the short-term debt exposed the country to the risk o f  a bank crisis. Corsetti et 
al. (1998) argue that banks would not have been able to liquidate assets rapidly without huge 
losses if  foreign lenders had suddenly refused to roll over short-term debt to domestic banks, 
precipitating a credit crisis.
Due to the high financial leverage and excessive short-term debt, the corporate sector had 
been faced with high default risk over the business cycle. Such inherent vulnerability was 
worsened by both a large negative shock in terms o f trade and weak domestic demand in 1996- 
97 (See Figure lV-3). During this period, Korea’s terms o f trade deteriorated by more than 20 
percent due to the collapse o f export price in international market, particularly the price of 
semiconductors the biggest single Korean export item.
<Figure IV-3> Terms of Trade (Index)
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As a result, a number o f highly indebted Korean conglomerates ran into serious liquidity 
problems before the actual crisis hit the country in late 1997. These major bankruptcies directly 
increased the fragility o f the financial institutions that had excessive exposure to these business 
groups, and undermined foreign investors’ confidence and eventually made them rush out o f the 
country.
The rest of the sub-section is organized into two parts. The first part is an introduction to 
the motives for the heavy indebtedness o f the Chaebols. This sub-section will prove the fact that 
the essential aspect o f the crisis lies at the moral hazard o f the corporate sector. The second part 
analyzes the Chaebols ’ indebtedness trends. By doing this, this sub-section will explain that the 
Chaebols were already on the path to an economic disaster years before the actual financial crisis 
hit the country.
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4.1.1 Motives for high Indebtedness
There are several factors encouraging the Chaebols' high debt financing business 
practice. First, the government’s implicit risk sharing with Chaebols, which resulted in the 
serious problem of the moral hazard, was one o f  the most critical motivations for the heavy 
indebtedness o f the Chaebol. The large conglomerates could pursue heavily indebted growth 
under the impression that the government would bail them out when their businesses were in 
trouble. In fact the government was heavily involved in massive bailouts on numerous occasions 
during the past decades, including the emergency debt freeze in 1972 and restructuring o f major 
heavy chemical industries in the early 1980s'\ These government bailouts eliminated the fear o f 
bankruptcy and encouraged Chaebols to increase their dependency on government-backed loans. 
The frequent government bailouts o f troubled and insolvent firms, therefore, caused the moral 
hazard, which encouraged large corporations to have large amounts o f debt.
Second, the history of government involvement in bank lending decisions also promoted 
the Chaebols ’ heavy debt financing. As a result o f  a tradition whereby the government implicitly 
underwrote banking risks, banks developed limited skills in credit analysis and risk management. 
Although the government greatly reduced its involvement in bank lending decisions, substantial 
moral hazard remained, reflecting the implicit guarantee that Korean banks had never been 
allowed to fail (Balino and Ubide, 1999). The moral hazard within the banking system made it 
easy for the conglomerates to access money that invested in various fields without adequate 
scrutiny. Thus, the Chaebols were able to indulge in risky moral hazard-driven lending from 
these institutions.
The government bailed out many insolvent companies to protect workers from being unemployed, the adverse 
effect of big business failures on the entire economy, and protect the overseas financial reputation o f  Korean firms 
(Lee, 1999).
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Third, Chaebols preferred bank loans because they could enjoy the interest differential 
rent. Interest differentials arise from the dual structure o f interest rates -  in other words, the 
difference between the market rate and the government-regulated rate***. Capital was usually 
under-priced throughout the rapid growth period. In the 1960s and 1970s, by means o f 
promoting the economic development plan, the government chose a financial repression policy 
to achieve various kinds o f industrial policy goals (Kim, 1997). As the interest rates from 
commercial banks were historically attractive to borrowers as compared to time deposit rates or 
inflation rates, the Chaebol financed investments with borrowed funds from the commercial 
banks (See Table 11-3).
Fourth, the higher dependency on debt financing made it possible for the Chaebol 
families to control a large business group with a relatively small amount o f shares through 
circular share holdings. For example, according to Lee (1999), firm A i n a  Chaebol group owns 
a share o f firm B worth 1 million dollars, firm B owns a share o f  a share o f firm C worth 1 
million dollars, and finally firm C owns a share o f firm A worth 1 million dollars. This 1 million 
dollars does not represent a real asset and it is a paper asset existing only in the accounting 
system. On average, the owner and relatives own only about 10 percent o f  the Chaebol group’s 
stock in the top 30 business groups. However, circular share holdings by other affiliated firms 
that own an additional 30 percent o f shares enable the largest shareholder to control the firms. In 
other words, although family owners hold 10 percent o f the shares o f several core companies 
within the group, these companies themselves posses holding in other companies in the group. 
This means that Chaebol families contribute a relatively small amount o f  their wealth to the total
"  The borrowing cost differential between protected and unprotected industries was about 2-3 percentage points 
during 1972-1984, at a time when nominal lending interest rates averaged 16 percent. Under these conditions, the 
Chaebols could exploit quasi-rents accompanying loan market disequiiiforia (Balino and Ubide, 1999).
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capitalization o f their business groups and yet exercise absolute control over their business 
groups by means of circular share holdings and debt financing.
Fifth, debt financing was also encouraged by internal financial arrangement, namely the 
cross debt guarantee system, within Chaebols themselves. The conglomerates were able to 
guarantee bank loans and other forms of corporate debt among their affiliates because those 
mother companies were “too big to fail”. In other words. Chaebols ’ subsidiaries were able to get 
bank loans due to their mother companies’ debt guarantees. The total value o f  the debt payments 
guaranteed by the affiliates o f the top 30 Chaebols amounted to 91 percent o f  their total equity 
capital in the mid-1997 (Gobat, 1998). The practice o f providing cross debt guarantees among 
affiliates o f business groups, therefore, allowed firms to borrow more easily, and this easy credit 
led to high leverage in the corporate sector.
Finally, the debt ratio also increased due to low retained earnings and the long-term 
stagnation of the stock market, making it difficult for Chaebols to raise capital. After the boom 
period o f the stock market from 1987 to 1989, the Korean stock market declined except for a few 
years o f transient recovery (Nam et al., 1999). Therefore, firms met their capital needs with 
debt, mainly credits from bank and non-bank financial institutions.
The fundamental aspect o f the Chaebols' motivations for high indebtedness lies, 
however, in the moral hazard, reflecting the implicit assumption that large corporations were 
“too big to fail”. The Chaebols were not allowed to go bankrupt due to their massive socio­
economic impact. In such an environment, the Chaebols’ incentive structure with regard to 
corporate financing was seriously distorted: the more they borrow, the safer they are. These fault 
lines made the corporate sector extremely vulnerable to unfavourable shock and increased 
financial market’s fragility.
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4.1.2 Indebtedness Trends of the Chaebols
The promotion o f heavy chemical industries in a country with a credit based financial 
system resulted in the extremely high financial leverage o f industrial companies. There is no 
doubt that the high debt levels of the Korean corporate sector led to massive insolvency and 
bankruptcies o f the Chaebols, and eventually to the economy’s vulnerability. The financial 
vulnerability o f Korean firms can also be seen from the high debt/equity ratios (See Table IV-1 
and Table IV-2). By the end of 1997, the average debt/equity ratio of the 30 largest Chaebols 
reached 519 percent, about five times higher than that o f Taiwan (Gobat, 1998). A striking point 
is that such extremely high debt/equity ratios had shown for several years before the crisis. In 
1995, the debt/equity ratios o f several Chaebols were already at super-high levels: Hanbo Steel 
Co. (675 percent). New Core Group (924 percent), Jinro Group (2,441 percent), Halla Group 
(2,885 percent), and Sammi Group (3,245 percent). In 1997, the ratios o f total borrowings to 
sales for those bankmpt Chaebol groups were extremely high as well: Hanbo Steel Co. (1,112.9 
percent), Jinro Group (169.4 percent), and Sammi Group (116.5 percent) (See Table IV-3). As a 
result, before the financial crisis all o f the above Chaebols either went bankrupt or were subject 
to legal procedures related to composition or reorganization.
To be sure, all the Chaebols that ran into trouble in 1997 had already been experiencing 
considerable financial stress, and thus were vulnerable to the shocks that occurred over the 
course o f 1997. These troubled Chaebols were much more indebted than the average of the top 
30 Chaebols, Furthermore, these Chaebols had been posting operating losses since 1993 (See 
sub-section 4 at the end o f this chapter). Many Chaebols had shown signs of rapidly 
deteriorating financial health. The Chaebols were, therefore clearly already on the path to 
economic disaster years before the actual financial crisis hit the country.
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<Table lV-1 > Capital Structure of the 30 largest Chaebols, 1997
(billion Won)
Assets Sales Equity Debt
1. Hyundai 72,415 78,690 10,670 61,745
2. Samsung 63,536 66,939 13,492 50,044
3. Daewoo 51,791 49,570 9,055 42,736
4. LG 51,435 58,344 8,491 42,944
5. SK 29,019 30,167 5,109 23,910
6. Hanjin 19,037 10,408 1,889 17,148
7. Ssangyong 14,930 20,812 2,988 11,942
8. Hanwha 12,056 11,192 917 11,139
9. Kumho 10,232 5,163 980 9,252
10. DongAh 8,770 4,508 1,907 6,863
11. Lotte 8,842 7,873 2,794 6,048
12. Halla 8,552 6,158 -570 9,122
13. Daelim 6,688 6,574 1,090 5,598
14. Doosan 6,585 3,690 954 5,631
15. Hansol 6,094 3,183 1,219 4,875
16. Hyosung 5,244 6,283 928 4,316
17. Kohab 5,155 3,256 901 4,254
18. Kolon 4,812 4,915 902 3,910
19. Dongkuk 4,594 3,280 1,084 3,510
20. Dongbu 4,375 3,572 998 3,377
21. Anam 4,300 2,446 269 4,031
22. Jinro 4,253 1,618 -536 4,789
23.Tongyang 3,152 2,280 625 2,527
24. Haitai 3,747 3,259 234 3,513
25. Shinho 3,045 1,932 392 2,653
26. Daesang 2,842 1,598 380 2,462
27. New Core 2,845 2,478 151 2,694
28.Keopyong 2,626 1,373 488 2,138
29. Kangwon 2,665 3,381 561 2,104
30. Saehan 2,659 1,603 512 2,147
Total 462,296 406,545 68,874 357,422
Source: Fair Trade Commission: Quoted in Gobat (1998, p.34).
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<Table IV-2 > Top 30 Chaebols’ Debt/Equity Ratios
(percent)
1995 1996 1997
Chaebols Debt/Equity Chaebols Debt/Equity Chaebols Debt/Equity
Ratio Ratio Ratio
1. Hyundai 376.4 1. Hyundai 436.7 I. Hyundai 578.7
2. Samsung 205.8 2. Samsung 267.2 2. Samsung 370.9
3. LG 312.8 3. LG 346.5 3. Daewoo 472.0
4. Daewoo 336.5 4. Daewoo 337.5 4. LG 505.8
S. SK 343.3 5. SK 383.6 5. SK 468.0
6. Ssangyong 297.7 6. Ssangyong 409.4 6. Hanjin 907.8
7. Hanjin 612.7 7. Hanjin 556.6 7.Ssangyong* 399.7
8. Kia 416.7 8. Kia 516.9 8. Hanwha* 1,214.7
9. Hanwha 620.4 9. Hanwha 751.4 9. Kumho 944.1
10. Lotte 175.5 10. Lotte 192.1 10. DongAh* 359.9
11. Kumho 464.4 11. Kumho 477.6 11. Lotte 216.5
12. Doosan 622.1 12. Halla 2,065.7 12. Halla+ -1,600.4
13. Daelim 385.1 13. DongAh 354.7 13. Daelim 513.6
14. Hanbo 674.9 14. Doosan 688.2 14. Doosan 590.3
15. DongAh 321.5 15. Daelim 423.2 15. Hansol 399.9
16. Halla 2,855.3 16. Hansol 292.0 16. Hyosung 465.1
17. Hyosung 315.1 17. Hyosung 370.0 17. Kohab* 472.1
18. Dongkuk 190.2 18. Dongkuk 218.5 18. Kolon 433.5
19. Jinro 2,441.2 19. Jinro 3,764.6 19. Dongkuk* 323.8
20. Kolon 328.1 20. Kolon 317.8 20. Dongbu 338.4
21.Tongyang 278.8 21. Kohab 590.5 21. Anam* 1,498.5
22. Hansol 313.3 22. Dongbu 261.8 22. Jinro+ -893.5
23. Dongbu 328.3 23.Tongyang 307.8 23.Tongyang 404.3
24. Kohab 572.0 24. Haitai 658.5 24. Haitai+ 1,501.3
25. Haitai 506.1 25. New Core 1,225.6 25. Shinho* 676.8
26. Sammi 3,244.6 26. Anam 478.5 26. Daesang 647.9
27. Hanil 936.2 27. Hanil 576.8 27.New Core* 1,784.1
28. Kukdong 471.2 28.Keopyong 347.6 28.Keopyong* 438.1
29. New Core 924.0 29. Miwon 416.9 29. Kangwon 375.0
30. Byucksan 486.0 30. Shinho 490.9 30. Saehan 419.3
Average 347.5 386.5 519.0
Note; * denotes business groups whose subsidiaries were subject to corporate workout after 
the financial crisis o f 1997 and + denotes the business groups that became insolvent. 
Source: Fair Trade Commission: Quoted in Nam et al. (1999, p.25).
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<Table IV-3 > Total Borrowing to Sales of the Bankrupt Chaebols, 1997
(100 million fVon, percent)
Groups Total Borrowing Total Sales Total Borrowing to Sales
Hanbo 50,970 4,580 1,112.9
Sammi 17,390 14,923 116.5
Jinro 25,257 14,910 169.4
Kia 97,398 121,440 80.2
Haitai 29,329 27,157 108.0
New Core 12,843 18,276 70.3
Halla 54,528 52,973 102.9
Source: Samsung Economic Research Institution, 1999 p.2.
The debt/equity ratios o f the Korean Chaebols were also excessively high compared to 
business groups in other countries (See Table IV-4). The average debt/equity ratios o f these 30 
Chaebol groups in 1996 was 450 percent, which is approximately 3 times those o f American 
groups, 2.5 times Japanese Zaibatsu, and 5 times Taiwanese groups. This ratio is also high not 
just for Chaebols but for the manufacturing industry as a whole compared with other industrial 
countries. These high debt/equity ratios o f the Chaebols reduced flexibility and increased 
vulnerability o f the corporate sector’s cash flow, because debt payments have to be paid even if 
in bad times while equity payments do not.
<Table IV-4> International Comparison of the Average Debt/Equity Ratios
Korea United States Japan Taiwan
Manufacturing 30 Chaebols
1991 307 403 147 209 98
1992 319 426 168 202 93
1993 295 398 175 202 88
1994 303 403 167 196 87
1995 287 388 160 196 86
1996 317 450 154 187
Note: Non-flnancial subsidiaries o f 30 largest Chaebols. 
Source: Fair Trade Commission: Quoted in Gobat (1998, p. 15).
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The high debt burden also resulted in high debt serving costs (See Figure IV-4). Interest 
expense in the manufacturing sector averaged 5-6 percent o f sales, roughly three times as large 
as Japan and Taiwan. Given the high debt leverage o f the corporate sector, a large share of 
operating earnings went to servicing their debts. The more debts the Chaebols had, the more 
interest payments were made to service the firm’s debt.
<Figure IV-4> International Comparison of Corporate Debt Service Costs
as Percentage of Sales
(%>1 w
n
I n o
Note: Manufacturing sector.
Source: Bank of Korea, Financial Statement Analysis: Quoted in Nam et al., 1999 p.7.
Moreover, the Chaebols ’ high leverage problem was worsened by the excessive exposure 
to the short-term external debt. During 1994-96, Korean companies implemented gigantic 
facility expansions, which relied heavily on borrowing from domestic financial institutions. 
Korean banks met the increased demand for funds by turning to foreign borrowing, often at short 
maturities'^. As a result, in Korea, short-term debt with a maturity o f  less than one-year 
accounted for 62.2 percent o f the total foreign debt of US$ 100 billion at the end of 1996 and
Several factors explain the reliance on short-term capital inflows. For details, see Balino and Ubide, ‘The Korean 
Financial Crisis of 1997 -  A Strategy of Financial Sector Reform”, IMF, 1999.
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61.0 percent o f USS 104.0 billion as o f September 1997 (See Table IV-5). Over the course o f 
capital account liberalisation occurring since the early 1990s, short-term capital inflows were 
liberalised in advance o f long-term inflows (Nam et al., 1999). Consequently, Korean banks 
borrowed from abroad in the short-term, and lent funds in the long-term. In other words, 
domestic banks channelling external short-term funds to long-term loans that financed facility 
investments by the corporations caused a serious maturity mismatch problem'^. This maturity 
mismatch resulted in the inability o f the financial institutions to roll over their short-term foreign 
borrowings which, in turn, eventually triggered the financial crisis.
<Table IV-5> Details of Korea’s Foreign Debt before the Crisis
(US$ billion, percent)
1995.12 1996.12 1997.9
Total Foreign Debt 45.3 100.0 104.0
Short-term Debt/Total Foreign Debt 57.8 62.2 61.0
Source: Yoo and Moon, 1999 p. 11-12.
In summary, moral hazard-driven high financial leverage and heavy exposure to short­
term debt o f the Chaebols were both extremely vulnerable to cyclical shocks as well as to 
changes in market expectations. Such vulnerability was worsened by an adverse shock in terms 
o f trade occurring in the first half o f 1996. As a result, 14 out o f the top 30 largest Chaebols ran 
into serious liquidity problems before the financial crisis hit the country in late 1997. These 
large bankruptcies significantly damaged the asset position o f  financial institutions and 
undermined foreign investors’ confidence making them rush out o f  the country. The corporate 
insolvency problem, driven by the high indebtedness o f the Chaebols, translated into domestic 
financial crisis, and ultimately caused the external liquidity crisis.
For more details, see Nam et ai, “Corporate üovemance m Korea", Korea Development Institute, 1999.
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4.2 Investment Inefficacy
Investments by the Chaebols into high-risk business projects are also regarded as one of 
the key factors that caused the Korean financial crisis. During 1994-96, Korean corporations 
undertook a major investment expansion, particularly in the manufacturing sector. An example 
o f this is the chemical industry, where Korea added almost as much new capacity between 1990 
and 1997 as the whole o f Western Europe with a goal o f increasing their market share in the 
markets, even though world markets for many products were already glutted (The McKinsey 
N o .4 ,1998). This huge capacity expansion o f Chaebols was manageable so long as the economy 
was growing, even though returns on investment were often low'’ due to their over capacity, 
driven by the moral hazard and ruthless competition among large Chaebols.
The investment boom during 1994-96, however, turned out to be unsustainable when the 
terms o f trade deteriorated about 20 percent in the first half o f 1996, the largest drop since the 
first oil shock o f 1974 (Haggard and Mo, 2000). The sharp fall in export prices, mainly 
reflecting the oversupply in the semiconductor market and a decline in foreign demand, resulted 
in substantial losses in the export sector. This huge deterioration o f the terms of trade severely 
damaged Chaebols ' profitability, which was potentially dangerous given the over leveraged and 
over invested structure o f the Korean corporate sectors. As a result, starting ft'om the beginning 
of 1997, a number o f the highly leveraged Chaebols went into bankruptcy dragged down by a 
substantial debt burden. These massive bankruptcies inevitably undermined the soundness o f 
financial institutions, and the financial crisis quickly degenerated into a full economic crisis.
According to Corsetti et ai. (1998), with a prime rate in local currency that before the crisis was as high as 12 
percent, the return on invested capital (ROIC) for Korean Chaebols was well below the cost o f capital in the 1992- 
96 period. For example, in the case of Hanbo, Sammi and Jinro (the first Chaebols to collapse in 1997) the ROIC at 
the end o f 1996 was as low as 1.7 percent, 3.2 percent and 1.9 percent respectively.
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4.2.1. Motives for Excessive Investment
There are six factors that encouraged the Chaebols' excessive investment business 
practice. First, the government’s implicit risk sharing with Chaebols, which resulted in a serious 
problem of moral hazard, was one of the most critical motivations for the excessive investment 
o f the Chaebol. The consequence of this close govemment-business relationship induced the 
investment inefficiency o f the Chaebols. In other words, the myth o f “too big to fail” allowed 
the Chaebol groups to set a goal o f size maximization at the expense o f more rational 
management objectives. Even with low expected returns, risky investment became inevitable 
when the Chaebols determined that they were protected from the risks o f investment losses. Due 
to their ability to simply walk away from failure. Chaebols indulged in over investment 
behaviour.
Second, in Korea, the government policy had always been devoted to the growth o f 
Chaebols with the belief that large-scale firms had an advantage in global competition. 
Accordingly, business firms pursued size-oriented business strategies to meet the government’s 
need. Business decisions were predicted, therefore, on the company being either ‘strong’ or 
‘big’ enough to survive, instead of making the rational or right business decision (Kim, 1997). 
Thus, the management goals o f firms were focused on size and volume, instead o f achieving 
technological development for productivity growth. The result o f  Chaebol's expansion strategy 
was over investment in the economy, especially in the manufacturing sector (Haggard and Mo, 
2000). The Chaebols were eager to expand plant capacity in the hope o f having more market 
share and achieving lower production costs due to economies o f scale '\
Economies of scale is achieved when average costs are reduced through the production of a single item in large quantities 
(Liiu, Î99S).
55
According to Park (1999), the Chaebols ’ focus on size was the result o f  two factors. One 
is the regulation o f price and entry to markets, and the other is the existence o f huge demand in 
the economy. Price regulations were implemented based on the cost plus pricing that essentially 
guaranteed a fixed margin on product sales. Consequently, an increase in business volume in 
times o f high demand, entry barriers, and price regulation automatically guaranteed an increase 
in operating profits to the Chaebols.
Third, the high competition among the Chaebols to have more market share and not to 
fall behind rivals stimulated their investment. The Chaebols considered an increase o f market 
share to be more important than the rate o f profit. As a result, two or more groups often 
simultaneously made large-scale investments in the same industrial fields in order to increase 
their own market share.
Fourth, the cost o f capital below market price encouraged Chaebols ' investment in the 
capacity expansion. Large Chaebols had more chance to get the favourable credit from the 
government due to their gigantic size. Thus, credit was particularly distributed to the Chaebols 
in several o f the government’s strategic industries, including semiconductors, consumer 
electronics, steel, automobile, and petrochemicals. For example, during the heavy chemical 
industry promotion drive by the government in the 1970s, the government directed banks and 
non-banking financial institutions to supply more than SO percent o f total domestic credit as a 
heavily subsidised loan (Nam et al., 1999). In Korea, the problem was compounded by the 
government’s attempt to pick winners by directing cheap credit toward favoured large industries 
(The Economist, 1997).
Fifth, managerial desire for maximization o f the size o f  their firm induced Chaebols ’ 
investment. According to Lee (1999), one o f  the most important causes for the decline o f  the
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firms has to do with wrong strategic business decisions made by the owner, especially by the 
second-generation owner-manager who inherited the company from his father. The typical 
behaviour and motivation o f the second-generation owner-manager includes a very aggressive 
mind-set and desire. A new manager-owner feels he must prove not only that he is as good as 
his father but also that he can achieve something new and different. Such a mentality leads to 
careless expansion into new business areas, often putting the whole group into jeopardy. 
Samsung’s decision to enter the automobile business in 1995, when the domestic market was 
already oversupplied by four established manufacturers, is one good example. Under the 
second-generation owner-manager President Lee’s control, nearly USS 2 billion was poured into 
the new business. However, due to the already glutted domestic market situation, Samsung 
Motors bankrupted with USS 1.4 billion debt in 1998.
Finally, the Chaebols often made huge speculative investments in real estate for either 
business or non-business use, because it is often possible in Korea to achieve enormous amounts 
o f profit from increases in real estate prices. In this manner, according to Kim (2000), the 
owners can earn large margins from the rise in real estate price. They argue that according to the 
closing account at the end o f 1997, the listed book value o f real estate possessed by business 
firms was approximately 31.8 trillion Won. Since the official price of that real estate was about 
53.8 trillion Won, if their assets were to be re-estimated, they would be expected to have a 
margin o f about 22 trillion Won. Unlike other East Asian countries, however, this real estate 
bubble in Korea had a relatively small impact on the onset o f the crisis.
There are many factors that caused investment inefficiency o f  Chaebol, but the 
fundamental aspect o f  the Chaebols’ motivations for over-investment lies in moral hazard, 
reflecting the implicit assumption that large corporations were “too big to fail”. In other words,
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the myth o f  “too big to fail” allowed the Chaebol groups to set a goal of size maximization, at 
the expense o f more rational management objectives. Even with low expected returns, 
excessively risky investment became inevitable when the Chaebols determined that they were 
protected from the risks of investment losses. Due to their ability to simply walk away from 
failure. Chaebols indulged in over investment behaviour.
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4.2.2 Investment Trends of the Chaebols
The Chaebols ’ investment inefBciency problem can be narrowed down into excessive- 
capacity and declining profitability. In terms of excessive-capacity, first o f all, too much 
investment led to excessive capacity in many industrial sectors. For example, makers o f rolled 
aluminium suffered from about 60 percent over capacity in 1997. Korean automakers, 
meanwhile, used just 40 percent o f their 4.5-million-unit annual capacity at the same period 
(McKinsey Quarterly 1998 No.4, 1998). In terms of the profit rate, second o f all, the ratio of 
equity o f  the manufacturing firms in 1996 fell dramatically to 2.0 percent as against 11.0 percent 
the year before, and deteriorated further to register negative 4.2 percent in 1997 (Lee, 1999).
According to Haggard and Mo (2000), the Korean firms’ subsequent insolvency is to be 
found in the investment boom o f 1994-1996. During these three years, facility investment in 
manufacturing rose by 38.5 percent per year (See Table IV-6). Investment was particularly 
robust in 1994 and 1995, when it grew at rates o f 56.2 and 43.5 percent respectively. The 
majority o f investment (65.7 percent) went to expand existing production lines, and a relatively 
small amount was allocated to other sectors, such as corporate restructuring and rationalizing. 
Moreover, investments in the heavy chemical industry grew at the annual rate o f 43.1 percent 
while the rate growth for light industries was only 15 percent. In terms o f firms size, large firms 
-  rather than small and medium-sized firms -  set the pace. Investments by large enterprises grew 
45.7 percent while small and medium-sized enterprises increased their investments by 17.7 
percent. In summary, this was a boom dominated by real manufacturing investment on the part 
o f the large Chaebols in heavy industries: automobiles, petrochemicals, steel and electronics.
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<Table IV-6 > Cycles of Facility Investment
(percent)
1972-
1979
1980-
1982
1983-
1991
1992-
1993
1994-
1996
1997-
1998
Average Growth Rate
All Industries 41.8 1.3 20.0 -1.0 30.1 -18.8
Manufacturing 41.3 -11.3 29.6 -8.9 38.5 -29.0
Heavy and Chemical Industry 39.9 -11.2 32.0 -10.8 43.1 -28.6
Light Industry 46.8 -8.2 22.5 0.9 15.0 -32.0
Large Enterprises 39.6 0.3 28.7 -7.6 45.7 -11.6
Small Medium Enterprises 53.2 -22.0 24.0 -10.5 17.7 10.5
Non-Manufacturing 42.7 21.8 10.0 15.5 17.3 1.1
Reason for Investment (Manufacturing)
Capacity Expansion 62.9 62.9 69.6 61.2 65.7 66.5
Rationalisation 20.7 20.7 17.3 20.1 15.5 14.7
Pollution Control 4.1 4.1 1.1 2.5 2.5 1.7
Research and Development Facilities 3.6 3.6 4.3 6.6 6.2 8.4
Others 8.6 8.6 8.5 9.7 10.1 8.9
Sources of Funds (Manufacturing)
External Financing 76.4 76.4 65.8 68.7 71.7 72.7
Bank Loans 20.1 20.1 31.0 31.5 29.5 32.6
Foreign Currency Borrowing 12.9 12.9 12.1 10.3 20.4 11.4
Internal Financing 23.6 23.6 34.2 31.3 28.3 27.3
Source: Korea Development Bank, Survey o f  Facility Investment Plans (Seoul), various issues: 
Quoted in Haggard and Mo (2000, p.201).
Haggard and Mo (2000) argue that compared with the two previous episodes o f rapid
investment growth (1972-79, 1983-91), the 1994-1996 period displays two distinguishing
features. First, the emphasis on manufacturing and large enterprises was even more marked than
in the past. Second, dependence on foreign capital was much higher in 1994-1996 (20.4 percent)
than it had been during 1972-1979, when it accounted for only 12.9 percent o f tlie total
investment, or 1983-1991, when it financed 12.1 percent.
There are some studies analyzing Chaebol investment trends. For example, Hahn's
(1999) argues that Chaebols ’ over investment behaviour is based on moral hazard. Using data
from the financial statements o f  586 listed companies in Korea during the 1992-1997 period, he
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analyses the investment behaviour o f firms. By using a modified sales accelerator model, this 
study shows that firms with the expectation o f government protection invested more than those 
firms without such expectation. It also shows that firms with such expectations are more likely 
to increase investments as the degree o f uncertainty increases rather than those that cannot be 
protected from investment losses. The top ranking Chaebols maintain higher investment rates 
than those o f other group-affiliated firms or independent firms. Thus, the results obtain 
consistency with the story o f  the excessive risk-taking behaviour o f top ranking Chaebols, in so 
far as the firms are grouped according to the characteristic that reflect the extent o f government 
protection'^
Another study, Eo (1999) runs a regression analysis using both a logit model and a probit 
model with the 1993-1997 data o f 35 Chaebol groups including eighteen bankrupt groups in 
order to analyse Chaebols ’ over investment behaviour. In his study, the dummy variable of 
bankruptcy/non-bankruptcy is used as a dependent variable while the average annual growth rate 
o f tangible fixed assets (GTEA) is used as one o f the independent variables. From the analysis, 
GTFA is shown to be positively related to the probability o f bankruptcy and that the variable is 
also highly significant (See Table lV-7). The rate o f increase in tangible fixed assets for the top 
35 Chaebols in two years from 1995 to 1997 are much higher than the rates o f increase in the 
previous two years from 1993 to 1995. There are no exceptions even if  the Chaebols are 
categorized into three different groups according to their rankings. By looking at this sharp rise 
in the rate o f increase in the latter two years, compared with former two years, it can then be said 
that the Chaebol groups aggressively increased their investment.
”  See Hahn, C H., “Implicit Loss-Protection and the Investment Behaviour o f  Korean Chaebols”, Korea 
Dcvclupiiieul luslilulc, 1999.
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<TabIe IV-7 > Tangible Fixed Assets of the 35 Largest Chaebols
(billion Won)
1993 1995 1997
Growth 
Rate (%) 
(93-95)
Growth 
Rate (%) 
(95-97)
Growth 
Rate (%) 
(93-97)
Total 31,985 44,609 75,826
Top 5 Average 6,397 8,922 15,165 16.6331 26.5254 21.5792
% 51.6 52.0 53.9
Total 14,558 19,106 28,384
Top 6-10 Average 2,912 3,821 5,677 13.5918 19.7913 16.6915
% 23.5 22.3 20.2
Total 15,412 21,995 36,442
Topll-35 Average 616 880 1,458 17.7839 25.2448 21.5144
% 24.9 25.7 25.9
Top 35 Total 61,955 85,710 140,652 16.2277 24.7659 20.4968
Average 1,770 2,449 4,019
Source: Eo, 1999 p.23
In summary, the massive capacity expansion of the large Korean conglomerates made 
Chaebols extremely vulnerable to cyclical shocks as well as to changes in market expectations. 
This massive capacity expansion o f the Chaebols was conducted under the impression that the 
government would do whatever was needed to facilitate the expansion, since the government 
policy had always been devoted to the growth o f Chaebols with the belief that large-scale firms 
have an advantage in global competition. Krugman (1998) argues that this implicit guarantee of 
government to the corporate sector and the inadequate regulation o f  financial intermediaries in 
Asian countries lead to moral hazard driven over-investment and asset bubbles, so that Asian 
countries under those conditions were inevitably vulnerable to the financial crisis.
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4.3 Extensive Diversification
The extensive diversification strategy o f  the Chaebols, often described as the “octopus 
tentacles” strategy in the Korean media, was also one o f the main culprits leading to the outbreak 
o f the financial crisis in Korea. Many critics argue that the diversification strategies o f the 
Chaebols failed to consider economic efficiency and resulted in excessive, debt-fueled 
diversification unsustainable in economic downturns (The Business Week, 1998).
The Chaebols operate in a wide series o f businesses ranging from electronics, 
shipbuilding, and construction to publishing companies, baseball teams, ski resorts, and hotels. 
Table IV-8 provides the summary statistics about the largely diversified top 30 Chaebol from 
1987 to 1997. On average, the top 30 Chaebols own about 27 subsidiaries in 20 different 
industries in 1997. Moreover, the top 5 Chaebols are particularly diversified in that they had on 
average 52 affiliates competing in 30 different industries in the same year. The number of 
affiliates belonging to each Chaebol exceeds the number o f  lines o f businesses because they 
diversify through the creation of new firms and the acquisition o f existing firms.
Nevertheless, the Korean Chaebol is not the only conglomerate in the world market 
engaging in multiple-line businesses which have a significant effect in economic activity. 
Montgomery (1994) shows that, on average, the top 500 U.S. firms engage in 10.9 industries, 
and among them, 40 companies engage in more than 30 industries. Thus, diversification o f large 
corporations is even pronounced in the developed countries. Despite this fact, the level of 
diversification in the Chaebols is rather high compared to that in the U.S., taking into 
consideration the differences between the 2-digit and 4-digit level o f industry classification'”.
For more details, see Hwang, I.H., “Diversification and Restructuring o f the Korean Business Groups”, Korea 
Economic Research Institute, 2000.
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What is unusual about the Chaebols compared with their foreign competitors is that Chaebols are 
more diversified into unrelated sectors (See Table IV-9). In other words, Korean Chaebols tend 
to go into unrelated areas whenever possible in the name o f diversification, even though the new 
area is not related to the group’s core competence.
<Table IV-8> Diversification of the Top 30 Chaebos, 1987-1997
1987 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Average Numbers of Affiliates 16.4 20.1 20.5 20.8 22.3 27.3
N/A <41 6> <4l.6> <4l.4> <4l.2> <52.4>
Average Numbers of 18.8 19.1 18.5 18.8 19.8
Industries Engaged N/A (31.2) (30.4) (29.8) (29.6) (30.2)
Total Number of Affiliates 509 604 616 623 669 819
Note I . The figures in < >  denote the number of affiliates that the top 5 Chaebols own.
2 The figures in ( ) denote the number o f industries that the top 5 Chaebols engage in. 
Sources: Hwang, 2000 p.5.
<Table IV-9 > International Comparison of Diversification by Big Businesses
(percent)
Types of 
Diversification
Korea
(1989)
Japan
(1973)
US.
(1969)
Italy
(1970)
France
(1970)
U.K.
(1970)
West Germany 
(1970)
Specialized 8.2 16.9 6.2 lO.O 16.0 6.0 22.0
Semi-specialized 28.6 36.4 29.2 33.0 32.0 34.0 22.0
Related 6.1 39.9 45.2 52.0 42.0 54.0 38.0
Unrelated 57.1 6.8 19.4 5.0 lO.O 6.0 18.0
Note: I. Forty-nine Chaebols for Korea, 118 firms for Japan, 100 firms for the other countries.
2. The sources above are not the latest due to the limitation o f my research. Yet, this table 
clearly shows that Chaebols are diversified into unrelated sectors in a comparative way. 
Sources: Yoo and Lim, 1997: Quoted in Gobat (1998, p.9)
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There are many different theories and arguments on the reasons for diversification of 
business corporations. Firstly, according to the agency view, motives for diversification lie in 
the manager’s pursuit o f  private benefit (Jenson, 1986). Unlike stockholders who pursue firm 
value or profit maximization, managers tend to maximize their profit by increasing the size of the 
firm through investment in various business areas. Secondly, the market power view (or the 
monopoly power hypothesis) stresses that the motives for diversification encompass a desire to 
limit any potential competitions with other firms (Hwang, 2000). In other words, the Chaebols 
want to monopolize their market power by using all possible anti-competitive ways such as 
cross-subsidization, mutual forbearance, and reciprocal buying.
Thirdly, the transaction cost hypothesis argues that firms diversify to internalize the high 
costs involved with market transaction resulting from market imperfection, and thus may predict 
the positive linkage (Hwang, 2000). By doing so, firms are able to achieve greater allocative 
efficiency and competitive advantage vis-à-vis other firms in the same market. Under certain 
circumstances, transactions within a group o f firms are more efficient than transactions through 
the market or transaction through the internal organization of the firm.
Finally, the resource-based view argues that diversification is pursued to utilise unused 
resources effectively by expanding their business to earn more profit (Song and Cho, 1999). 
Imperfections in the market’s ability to allocate resources efficiently causes business groups to 
diversify. Given an imperfect market, business groups can facilitate the resource allocation 
process using a diversification strategy. Since the Korean market is relatively small, a successful 
company that enters a saturated market with a relatively small scale o f operation must soon find 
new business opportunities.
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Some o f these above theories may explain the reasons for diversification o f Korean 
Chaebols. For example, Hwang (2000, p i2) argues that the transaction cost and the resource- 
based view deserve special attention when explaining why Korean conglomerates are so 
extensively diversified.
“Due to the relatively short history o f capitalism and the discretionary policy of 
the government in Korea, market institutions for economic activity has been distorted. In 
addition, most o f the firms have not as yet accumulated productive factors having high 
specificity that is sufficient enough to make it possible for them to yield high rates of 
return.”
However, these theories are inadequate to see the overall picture o f the diversification of 
Chaebols. The above arguments may be able to explicate the reasons for the diversification of 
the Chaebols, but they still cannot explain why Chaebols intended to diversify beyond their 
optimal limit. An often-cited criticism about the Chaebols is not just they pursue extensive 
diversification but that they pursue excessive diversification.
What factors played a primary role in the Chaebols ' diversification strategy? This sub­
section will prove that the essential aspect o f the diversification o f Chaebols lies in the moral 
hazard o f the corporate sector. Then the Chaebols ’ diversification trends will be discussed in 
order to prove that the moral hazard driven Chaebols' extensive diversification was one o f the 
structural weaknesses, which eventually caused the Korean financial crisis.
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4.3.1 Motives for Extensive Diversification
There are many factors that encouraged the Chaebols ' extensive diversification. First of 
all, the government’s implicit risk partnership with business groups, resulting in the problem of 
the moral hazard, played a primary role in the Chaebols ' extensive diversification. In Korea, the 
government pursued the Chaebols ' diversification as a part o f the national economic policy over 
the past three decades. Both the government and the Chaebol strove to create world-class large 
business groups that could effectively compete in the international market. As a result, the 
Chaebols could increase their size by means o f diversification while under the impression that 
the government would support and protect the big businesses fiom both domestic and foreign 
competition. In other words, because o f the government’s implicit guarantees, the Chaebols 
could diversify in various industries without due regard to the level o f risk. Therefore, the 
government’s implicit guarantees, driven by the moral hazard, encouraged the Chaebols to 
diversify into many industries with little risk to themselves.
Furthermore, diversification had been a strategy for gaining independence and autonomy 
from the state (Kim, 1997). Many Chaebols have undergone ownership changes in the past due 
to the government actions in the name o f industry rationalization policy^'. Given this political 
threat. Chaebols have exerted great effort to achieve maximization to make it difficult for the 
government to declare them bankrupt or to dismantle their groups, due to the economic side- 
effects that would follow such government action. Thus, the Chaebols diversified into non­
banking financial institutions (NBFI), such as insurance, securities, and short-term finance
In fact, many Chaebols had undergone ownership changes due to the government’s industrial rationalization 
policy in the past three decades. For instance, Kulge group, the seventh-largest Chaebol in 1985, disbanded for 
reasons including “reckless management”, and “exceedingly high rates of debt" (Kim, 1997 p20I). Hanil, which 
took over the Kukje companies, jumped from the twenty-third to the fourteenth-largest Chaebol as a result o f the 
takeover.
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companies, in order to become less dependent on the government for capital. Historically, 
Chaebols depended on the government for their necessary capital, because the banks belonged to 
the state. The state controlled the private sector by controlling the financial institutions. 
Chaebols were prohibited from owning banks during the 1960s and 1970s. In other words, 
business conglomerates had to listen to the government in order to get their capital for the 
business. This policy remained in effect until 1981, when the Chun regime announced partial 
privatization o f banks (Kim, 1997).
By diversifying into NBFIs, therefore, the Chaebols could use their affiliated NBFls to 
finance the activities o f other subsidiaries within their group in various ways: direct provision of 
funds, priority underwriting o f securities issued by related subsidiaries, and other forms o f unfair 
inter-group transaction. In other words, the NBFIs o f  the Chaebols allowed flexibility in cash 
flow for member companies and ready access to loans within the group. The Chaebols were able 
to become less dependent on the government by diversifying into NBFIs (Kim, 1997).
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4.3.2 Diversification Trends of the Chaebols
Unlike the specialization trends o f world-class firms, Korean Chaebols tended to go into 
unrelated areas whenever possible in the name of diversification, even though the new area was 
not related to the group’s core competence. Such extensive diversification not only prevented a 
Chaebol group from developing core competence in the new business area, but also weakened 
competence in their existing business areas (Lee, 1999).
Despite enforcement o f the government’s Chaebol specialization policy, the number of 
the subsidiaries of the thirty largest Chaebols did not change considerably until 1995. As Table 
IV-10 reveals, the average number o f subsidiaries o f the 30 largest Chaebols in 1995 was 20.8, 
with a total number o f 623 subsidiaries.
<Tabie IV-10> Number of Subsidiaries of the 30 Largest Chaebols
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Tops Total 208 208 207 206 262 257 234
Average 41.6 41.6 41.4 41.2 52.4 51.4 46.8
Top 6-10 Total 115 116 117 122 138 132 122
Average 23.0 23.2 23.4 24.4 27.6 26.4 24.4
Topi 1-30 Total 281 292 299 341 419 415 330
Average 14.1 14.6 15.0 17.1 21.0 20.8 16.5
Top 30 Total 604 616 623 669 819 804 686
Average 20.1 20.5 20.8 22.3 27.3 26.8 22.9
Source: Bank o f Korea, various years
The number o f subsidiaries started to increase in 1996 and 1997. In 1996 alone, the total
number of subsidiaries o f the 30 largest Chaebols increased to 669 fi*om 623 in the previous
year. In 1997, the numbers o f subsidiaries o f  the 30 largest Chaebols drastically increased to 819
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from 669. The greatest increase was found in the number o f the subsidiaries in the top five 
Chaebol groups; the average number o f subsidiaries increased by approximately 20 percent in 
1997. This number, however, slowly decreased from 1998 as a result o f the massive Chaebol 
bankruptcies and the corporate restructuring program. During 1999, in particular, the number of 
subsidiaries o f the 30 largest Chaebols sharply dropped to 686, from 804 in 1998.
The number o f business lines" o f the 30 largest Chaebols is shown in table IV-11. As 
can be seen, the number of business lines has gradually increased every year. In 1998, the top 5 
Chaebols had an average of 31 business lines, top 6 to 10 Chaebols had an average o f 22.6, and 
the rest o f the lower ranking 20 Chaebols had an average o f 16.5 business lines. The 30 largest 
Chaebol groups had operated in 20 different industries in average. Just by observing the 
numbers in table lV-11, it can be said that larger Chaebol groups are more diversified than 
smaller Chaebol groups. The top 5 Chaebols had twice as many different business lines, when 
compared with the 20 Chaebols from the ranking 11 to 30.
Simple indexes such as the number o f subsidiaries or the number o f business lines are not 
enough to properly measure the degree o f diversification. Since only a few subsidiaries and 
industries account for most o f the total sales o f a Chaebol group‘d, there is a need to examine the
“  According to Hwang (2000), the number o f business lines is the simplest o f diversification index. It disregards 
the relatedness o f industries and the relative importance of a particular commodity in a business group, and directly 
shows the degree o f diversification.
^  Although Chaebols own a lot of subsidiaries operating in many different industries, most o f  their sales revenues 
are generated by a few core firms. Between 1988 and 1995, according to Chang and Park (1999), the four largest 
subsidiaries o f the top 4 Chaebols generated an average o f 79.0 percent o f their total sales. Especially in the case of 
Samsung, the four largest firms, two o f which were in the same industry (electronics), alone accounted for about 90 
percent of sales -  a striking concentration (rather than diversification) o f activities given the number of its 
subsidiaries (55 as of 1995). Chang and Park (1999) argue that the same can be said of the smaller Chaebols, 
because the reliance on a small number o f subsidiaries tends to increase as their size diminishes. For instance, in 
1994, the Chaebols that ranked between the 6 and the 10 generated 72.6 percent o f their sales from the 4 largest 
subsidiaries. In the case o f the Chaebols ranking between the 11 and the 20, the 3 largest subsidiaries generated 
72.1 percent o f their sales, and in the case o f  the Chaebols that ranked between the 21 and the 30, as much as 72.3 
percent o f the sales were generated by the 2 largest subsidiaries. For more details, see Chang and Park, “An 
Alternative Perspective on Post-1997 Corporate Reform in Korea”, Korea Economic Research Institute, 1999.
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industry specialization ratio"'* and the Berry index‘d, to realize the diversification situation o f  the 
Chaebol groups and their characteristics.
<Table IV>11 > Number of Business Lines of the 30 Largest Chaebols
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Top 5 Total 156 152 149 148 151 155
Average 31.2 30.4 29.8 29.6 30.2 31.0
Top 6-10 Total n o 113 118 129 123 113
Average 22.0 22.6 23.6 25.8 24.6 22.6
Top 11-30 Total 283 307 289 326 321 331
Average 14.2 15.4 14.5 14.8 16.1 16.6
Top 30 Total 549 572 556 603 595 599
Average 18.8 19.1 18.5 18.8 19.8 20.0
Source: Bank o f Korea, various years
The industry specialization ratio is a ratio o f an industry that has the largest sales 
proportion in total sales of a group. The industry specialization ratio becomes I if  the Chaebol 
group is perfectly specialized in one main industry. Smaller numbers indicate the firm is less 
specialized, or more diversified. Table lV-12 shows that a Chaebol group in a higher rank has a 
smaller industry specialization ratio, which means a group is less specialized or relatively more 
diversified. However, the growth rate is higher in the low-ranking groups, which means they are 
more rapidly diversified than the high-ranking groups.
'* The industry specialization ratio is frequently used in empirical studies due to the simplicity of calculation and 
feasibility of gathering data. It fully reflects a group’s dependency on its main industry. However, it does not show 
the degree of diversification. For more details on how to calculate the index, see Kim, K.H., “Comparative Analysis 
o f Diversification and Performance o f the business Groups”, Yonsei Univ. 1993.
^  The Berry index is simply a transformation of the Herfindahl index, which measures market concentration. Its 
strength is that it reflects the relative importance o f all the industries in addition to the main industry. For more 
details on how to calculate the index, see Kim, K.H., “Comparative Analysis o f Diversification and Performance of 
the business Groups”, Yonsei Univ. 1993.
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Table IV-13 shows that a Chaebol group with a higher rank has a higher Berry index, 
meaning the degree o f diversification for the Chaebol groups has continued to increase. 
Although the table shows that high-ranking Chaebols are more diversified than low-ranking 
Chaebols, the rate o f  increase in the Berry index is higher in low-ranking Chaebols than in high- 
ranking Chaebols, as in an analysis with the specialization index.
<Table IV-12 > Industry Specialization Ratios of the 35 Largest Chaebols
(percent)
1993 1995 1997 Average Growth Rate 
(93-97)
Average annual 
Growth Rate
Top 5 0.42991 0.43265 0.42800 0.43019 -0.444 -0.111
Top 6-10 0.52472 0.55321 0.51980 0.53257 -0.937 -0.235
Top 11-35 0.65949 0.58880 0.53509 0.59446 -18.864 -5.226
Top 35 0.60744 0.56141 0.51709 0.56198 -14.874 -4.026
Source: Eo, 1999 p.34.
<Table lV-13 > Berry Index of the 35 Largest Chaebols
(percent)
1993 1995 1997 Average Growth Rate 
(93-97)
Average annual 
Growth Rate
Top 5 0.70608 0.69593 0.70752 0.70318 0.204 0.051
Top 6-10 0.58024 0.56821 0.60695 0.58513 4.604 1.125
Top 11-35 0.45871 0.54539 0.59548 0.53319 29.817 6.524
Top 35 0.51141 0.57015 0.61365 0.56507 19.991 4.556
Source: Eo, 1999 p.37.
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In summary, the Chaebols intended to diversify beyond their optimal limit based on the 
government’s implicit risk partnership with business groups, resulting in the problem o f moral 
hazard. In other words, because o f the government’s implicit guarantees. Chaebols could 
diversify in various industries without due regard to the level o f risk. Under this “guaranteed” 
circumstance, business conglomerates subsidized unprofitable subsidiaries by transferring funds 
across Chaebol groups and provided cross-guarantees on debts among affiliates, which 
eventually jeopardized the entire group (Lee, 1999). The diversified Chaebol structure acted as 
an exit barrier to unprofitable businesses in the group and eventually undermined the viability of 
the whole system. Therefore, the extensive diversification strategies o f the Chaebols, driven by 
moral hazard, weakened the entire companies by losing economic efficiency, and eventually 
caused the financial crisis.
73
4.4 Low Productivity and Profitability
The low productivity and profitability o f Chaebols are also critical factors on the path to 
the Korean financial crisis. In terms of productivity, although most of Korea's investment had 
been directed into manufacturing, giving the country almost as much manufacturing capital stock 
per capita as the U.S., labour and capital productivity in most Korean manufacturing sectors 
stood at less than half o f the U.S. levels between 1993 and 1995 (See Figure IV-5 and Figure IV- 
6). Before the financial crisis, Krugman (1994) argued that Asian economic growth is based 
mainly on massive inputs o f capital and labour rather than productivity growth and thus will not 
be sustainable over a long period. In this sense, the crisis was structural.
In terms of low profitability, the economic recession and the huge deterioration o f the 
terms of trade in 1996, particularly in the semiconductor manufacturing industry, negatively 
influenced on the profitability o f the Korean business conglomerates. As a result, although total 
sales o f the 30 largest Chaebol groups increased by 16.2 percent, their net income decreased by 
more than 90 percent in 1996 (See Table lV-14).
<Flgure IV-5> Productivity Comparison 
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<Figure IV-6> Capital allocation and Capital Productivity 1995
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Source: McKinsey Quarterly 1998 No.2, 1998 p.3.
<Table IV-I4> Business Performance of the 30 Largest Chaebols^ 1995-1996
Total Sales Net Profit
1995 1996 Growth Rate 1995 1996 Growth Rate
Top 10 194.5 228.4 17.4 5.7 0.6 -82.7
Top 30 226.4 263.2 16.2 5.8 0.6 -90.1
Note: Except Hanbo and New Core group. The values are based on listed firms only. 
Source: Samsung Economic Research Institute, 1998.
In addition to the economic recession, the rising wage costs in Korea contributed to the 
eroding profitability o f the firms, so that the corporate sector increasingly suffered from 
declining competitiveness and profits in the world market*^. Domestic wages grew faster than 
labour productivity during the last decade (See Table IV-IS), making Korean wages higher than 
those o f Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan (See Table IV-16). As a result, Korean companies’
Korean comparative advantages as a low wage country disappeared with the rise o f new competitors, such as 
China, in the world market. Besides, Korean products could not afford to compete with the products from an 
advanced country, such as Japan, in terms of quality and product differentiation (Lee. 19991.
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profitability deteriorated much below that o f firms in economies having significantly lower 
financial costs, such as Japan, Taiwan, and the U.S/^ (See Table IV-17). Therefore, with wages 
higher than labour productivity and interest rates higher than capital productivity over the past 10 
years, companies were unable to accumulate profits. Given the over-leveraged and over-invested 
structure o f  the Korean corporate sector, this decreasing profitability eventually made Korean 
firms very vulnerable to any shock; low profit decreased the ability to service the high debt that 
Korean companies accumulated.
<Table IV-15 > Wage and Labour Productivity Increase
(percent)
1971-1986 1987-1995
Wages Growth 21.2 16.1
Productivity Growth 26.8 13.1
Source: Korea Productivity Centre Estimates: Quoted in Cho (1999b, p.6).
<Table IV-16 > Hourly Wage in the Manufacturing Sector and Per Capita Income
(USS)
Hong Kong Japan Korea Singapore Taiwan U.S.
Hourly wage:
1985 1.73 6.34 1.23 2.47 1.50 13.01
1990 3.20 12.80 3.71 3.78 3.93 14.91
1995 4.82 23.66 7.40 7.28 5.82 17.20
Per Capita Income:
1995 22,990 39,640 9,700 26,730 12,293 26,980
Source: U.S. Bureau o f Labour Statistics, 1995: Quoted in Cho (1999b, p.6).
Cho (1999b) argues that real profitability, disguised by accounting practices, may have been much lower than the 
statistics suggest.
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<Table IV-17 > Corporate Profitability in Manufacturing, 1989-1993
(percent)
Japan Korea Taiwan U.S.
Current Profit/Sales 3.38 1.97 3.72 3.06
Current Profit/Assets 3.54 1.99 3.50 6.23
Net Profit/Capital N/A 5.03 11.77 N/A
Source: Bank o f Korea, “’Corporate Financial Statement Analysis ”, various issues: Quoted in 
Cho (1999b, p.7).
In summary, the fundamental aspect o f  the Chaebols' low profitability lies in their 
structural weaknesses. The huge debt-fueled capacity expansion of Chaebols was manageable so 
long as the economy was growing, even though investment returns were often too low to service 
the cost o f capital. The huge deterioration o f the terms o f trade, however, severely damaged 
Chaebols' profitability, which was potentially dangerous given the over leveraged and over 
invested structure o f the Korean corporate sector. The diversification strategies o f the Chaebols 
often failed to consider economic efficiency causing excessive, debt-fueled expansion 
unsustainable in economic downturns. Starting from the beginning o f 1997, therefore, a number 
of the highly leveraged Chaebols went into bankruptcy, dragged down by excessive investment 
and a substantial debt burden.
The following sub-sections analyze the low productivity and profitability o f the Korean 
firms in detail. By doing this, the sub-sections will explain that the large Chaebols were already 
on the path to an economic disaster years before the actual financial crisis hit the country.
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4.4.1 Low Productivity
According to Bello and Rosenfeld (1990), Korea's impressive growth over the past three 
decades can be explained largely by the fact that its people worked long hours and saved a great 
deal, leading to the rapid accumulation o f capital. Most o f Korea's investment has been directed 
into manufacturing, giving the country almost as much manufacturing capital stock per capita as 
the United States. Yet capital productivity in many manufacturing sectors is only half of U.S. 
levels. In semiconductor manufacturing, for example, Korean firms use machines similar to 
those employed by U.S. companies, but produce low-value DRAM chips instead of more 
complex microprocessors. Within the DRAM industry. Micron, the largest U.S. manufacturer, 
boasts capital productivity 50 percent higher than that o f the average Korean maker. Similarly, 
Korea's failure to implement lean manufacturing in the automotive industry means its car makers 
produce only half as many vehicles as their Japanese counterparts in a similar plant (McKinsey 
No.2, 1998).
Factor productivity was low in Korea. The productivity in the manufacturing industry 
can be seen collectively by analysing the rate o f value added. As can be seen from Figure lV-7, 
ordinary income began to decrease rapidly after 1995. In 1998, the ratio o f personnel expenses 
(labour cost) to value added fell to 47.1 percent from 54.5 percent in 1997. However, the ratio of 
financial expenses (capital cost from borrowing) to value added jumped suddenly to 31.7 in 1998 
from 20.8 percent in 1997 and the ratio o f  ordinary income to value added sharply dropped to -  
negative 8.1 percent in 1998 from negative 1.8 percent in 1997. This problem can be attributed 
to the increase in labour costs and net ftnancial expenses, because the ftnancial expense ratio in 
Korea was over three times the ratios in Japan and the U.S., due to the high market interest rate 
(See Figure IV-3). Productivity, however, has not improved equally to back-up these high costs
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(See Table IV-16). It can be said, therefore, that the business performance o f  the firms in Korea 
continuously worsened as a result o f wages higher than labour productivity and interest rates 
higher than capital productivity.
<Figure IV-7> Components of Value Added in the Manufacturing Industry
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Korea Development Bank, 1999 p.71.
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As Figure IV-8 shows, the value added growth rate per employee for the manufacturing 
sector began to fall sharply from 1995. In 1998, it recorded a stiff drop from 0.99 percent in 
1997 to -3.12 percent, due to the heavy losses in ordinary income from lagging sales, slim 
margins, and a huge amount o f  write-offs. The growth rate o f capital productivity (or value 
added to total liabilities and stockholders’ equity) gradually decreased from 1995 and recorded a 
slight drop from 18.2 percent in 1997 to 17.1 percent in 1998. This declining productivity can be 
explained by both the setback in total value added from low profitability in the prolonged 
economic recession, together with only a 2.9 percent increase in total liabilities and stockholders’ 
equity.
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<Figure IV-8> Major Productivity Indicators in the Manufacturing Industry
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In contrast, the growth rate o f labour productivity, or value added per employee, slowly 
rose from 1996 after dropping sharply in 1995. Productivity increased to 11.1 percent in 1998 
from 6.5 percent in 1997. However, this was due to a decrease in the number o f employees as a 
result o f restructuring and downsizing efforts carried out during 1998. In conclusion, although 
labour productivity showed an increase, the value added growth rate itself showed a drop from 
23.0 percent in 1997 to 22.0 percent in 1998. This fall was largely attributed to the huge deficit 
in ordinary income, reflecting inadequate margins and the negligence o f management on sales 
receivables. Also, the ratio o f value added to tangible fixed assets, a supplementary ratio to the 
growth rate o f capital productivity began to fall steeply from 1995 along with other productivity 
indicators. It reached its highest level o f 66.8 percent in 1995 but fell as low as to 41.0 percent 
in 1998-®.
^  For more details, see Korea Development Dank, “Analysis o f Financial Data for 1998 ", 1999.
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4.4.2 Low Profitability
In 1997, for the first time ever since the Korea Development Bank began its financial 
analysis in 1958, Korean firms recorded a deficit in ordinary income compared to total assets 
(Korea Development Bank, 1999). Figure IV-9 shows that after all three profitability indicators 
in the manufacturing industry recorded the highest values in 1995 they rapidly began to 
downturn. The ratio o f  ordinary income to sales and the ratio o f ordinary income to total assets 
began to drop steeply from 1995 and started to record deficits from 1997.
<Figure IV-9> Major Profitability Indicators in the Manufacturing Industry
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Source: Korea Development Bank, 1999 p.59.
The evidence o f  low profitability is also available at the firm level. Table IV-18 shows 
the long-term trend o f  the profit rates o f the Korean companies over the 1980 to 1996 period. In 
general, the table describes the decreasing trend over the concerned period. In particular, for the 
large-sized firms (including most o f the Chaebol firms) profit rates crashed fi-om 13.3 percent 
during the 1985-1989 to 0.2 percent during the 1990-1996.
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<Table IV-18 > Profit (Net Income) to Equity Ratio by Size of the Firms
(percent)
Year Large Medium Small
80 -8.8 -4.4 -3.7
81 -0.2 0.8 2.3
82 -4.5 2.5 4.5
83 7.4 11.5 13.9
84 7.4 9.9 10.4
85 4.0 8.4 6.4
86 16.3 12.1 13.9
87 18.6 14.6 15.4
88 16.0 14.6 15.5
89 11.7 14.1 13.0
90 1.7 7.0 8.1
91 0.4 7.0 7.4
92 -2.0 1.2 1.4
93 2.8 3.5 2.9
94 4.6 5.9 5.0
95 -1.3 0.4 2.3
96 -4.5 -1.6 0.3
Averaged by period 
1980-1984 0.3 4.1 5.5
1985-1989 13.3 12.8 12.8
1990-1996 0.2 3.3 3.9
1980-1996 4.1 6.3 7.0
Standard Deviation
1980’s 9.2 6.6 6.5
1990’s 3.1 3.4 3.0
1980-96 7.9 6.0 5.9
Source: Yoon, J. I., “A Study on the Return on Stockholders’ Equity in Korea”, Seoul National 
Univ., 1998: Quoted in Lee (1999, p. 19).
Table IV-19 measures the short-term change o f the profit rates particularly for the 10 and
30 largest Chaebols during the 1994-96 and depicts that over this period all the measures of
profitability declined by a substantial margin for the 30 largest business groups. This trend is
more clear-cut for the profitability measured using ordinary income rather than operating
income. Ordinary income compared to stockholders' equity rates declined from 8.46 percent in
1994 to a mere 0.75 percent in 1996 for the 10 largest Chaebols.
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<Table IV-19 > Changing Profitability of the Chaebols 
A. Profitability of the 10 Largest Chaebols in Korea
(percent)
1994 1995 1996
Operation Profit / Equity 15.37 28.95 24.66
Normal Profit / Equity 8.46 10.38 0.75
Operation Profit / Sales Revenue 6.22 6.23 4.7
Normal Profit / Sales Revenue 1.9 2.29 0.21
Operation Profit / Total Asset 6.34 6.74 5.02
Normal Profit / Total Asset 2.16 2.65 0.4
B. Profitability of the 30 Largest Chaebols in Korea
(percent)
1994 1995 1996
Operation Profit / Equity 6.23 1.11 0.87
Normal Profit / Equity 0.31 0.42 0.09
Operation Profit / Sales Revenue 0.22 0.23 0.17
Normal Profit / Sales Revenue 0.07 0.09 0.02
Operation Profit / Total Asset 0.22 0.25 0.18
Normal Profit / Total Asset 0.07 0.09 0.02
Source: Cho, S. “The Large Corporate Groups in Korea”, 1997: Quoted In Lee (1999, p.20).
Table IV-20 reveals the ratio o f operating income to sales among Korean firms was 
higher than in the United States, Japan, and Taiwan*^. However, the ordinary income to sales in 
Korea is exorbitantly lower when compared to these countries. This is because o f the sharp 
increase in financial expenses firom excess borrowing offset the favourable effect o f foreign
^  The main reason for the sales increase in 1997 was a favourable balance o f trade due to exchange rate 
appreciatiuu; this led to au increase in operating income as well (Bank, o f Korea, 1998).
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currency debt translation. Therefore, non-operating income was lowered, although the Korean 
companies showed similar profitability in operating activities. This resulted in an ordinary 
income of-1 .79 percent in 1998 compared to -0.42 percent in 1997 (Bank o f Korea, 1998).
<Table lV-20 > International Comparison of Business Performance in the Manufacturing Industry
(percent)
Index Financial Ratio Korea U.S. Japan Taiwan
Growth Sales Growth 11.0 6.7 0.2 16.4
Tangible Fixed Asset Growth 13.7 3.2 1.5 6.8
Profitability Operating Income to Sales 7.9 7.4 3.6 7.3
Ordinary Income to Sales -0.4 8.3 3.4 5.1
Financial Equity Ratio 20.2 39.4 34.1 53.9
Structure Current Ratio 91.8 137.9 130.0 129.4
Financial Expenses Ratio 6.4 - 1.0 2.2
Note: The values are based on 1997 for Korea, 1996 for Japan and U.S., and 1995 for Taiwan. 
Source: Bank of Korea, May 1998 p.29-35.
Therefore, the Korean economic crisis was a result o f  structural weaknesses in the 
corporate sector. The Korean Chaebols were already on the path to economic disaster, having 
shown low productivity and profitability years before the actual financial crisis hit the country. 
With high debt-equity ratios, Korean firms were expected to yield high profitability on their 
equity. However, the average rate o f return on the equity was lower than the prevailing interest 
rates for loans. On average, the return on capital was lower than its opportunity cost for almost 
ten years before the crisis. Thus, the capital used in the corporate sector was generally wasted on 
unprofitable projects. The high debt level and the low profitability o f  Korean firms were 
unsustainable.
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V. Conclusion
This paper has identified the critical factors underlying the Korean financial crisis. The 
crisis started with a series o f corporate bankruptcies in 1997. The massive large corporate failure 
ended with massive non-performing loans in the financial institutes severely affecting the 
soundness o f the domestic financial institutions. This substantial corporate/bank insolvency 
problem soon led to a serious loss o f confidence among international investors. A sudden shift 
in international creditors confidence in Korean firms and financial institutions occurred, 
prompting these investors to leave the market by cashing their investment and refusing to roll 
over their short-term lending. As a result, the corporate insolvency problem translated into 
domestic financial crisis, and ultimately caused the external liquidity crisis.
A comparative analysis o f two o f the most prominent arguments explaining the causes of
the crisis in Korea, the moral hazard and the financial panic theory, reveals that the moral hazard
approach interprets the Korean financial crisis. This moral hazard o f the corporate sector caused
four significant flaws, eventually triggering the financial crisis. First, the debt-equity ratio of the
top thirty Chaebols was over 500 percent in 1997, extremely high compared to firms in other
advanced countries. Such moral hazard-driven high leverage increased companies’ financial
expenses, eventually lowering the Chaebols ’ profitability. Second, large Chaebols undertook a
major investment expansion, particularly in the manufacturing sector between 1994 and 1996.
However, this moral hazard-driven massive investment boom turned out to be unsustainable
when the terms o f trade deteriorated by approximately 20 percent in 1996. This huge trade
deterioration severely damaged the Chaebols' profitability, which was potentially dangerous
given the over-leveraged structure o f  the Korean corporate sectors. Third, Chaebols operated in
a wide series o f businesses. Chaebols intended to diversify beyond their optimal limit based on
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the government’s implicit risk partnership with business groups. This extensive diversification 
strategy often failed to consider economic efficiency and resulted in excessive, debt-fueled 
expansion unsustainable in economic downturns, especially financial crisis. Finally, with wages 
higher than labour productivity and interest rates higher than capital productivity over the past 10 
years, companies were unable to accumulate profits. Under the above circumstances, the 
companies could not accumulate profits. For example, the average rate o f return on equity was 
lower than the prevailing interest rates for loans. Given the over leveraged and over invested 
structure o f the Korean corporate sector, profitability decreased making Korean firms very 
vulnerable to any shock; these low profits decreased the ability to service the high debt that those 
companies accumulated.
The effort o f the government to reform the Chaebol is in process now. The government, 
however, has not yet achieved enough success to continue the comprehensive Chaebol reform 
program. For example, the top 5 Chaebols are lagging far behind in the government’s 
restructuring plan and remained very resistant to government efforts to restructure until recently. 
Moreover, the government’s concentration on the top 5 Chaebols in its efforts at corporate 
restructuring, namely “big deals^°”, sent a wrong signal to the market that only the top 5 would 
be safe in periods o f financial turmoil (Root, 2000). In other words, the government policy 
created an economy-wide moral hazard by making the power o f the top 5 even greater than 
before (The Business Week, 1998).
The current reform plans in Korea, therefore, ought to focus on cleaning up the remnants 
o f the past moral hazard. In order to achieve this critical task, the government needs to take a
The government called for large Chaebols to engage in what is called “big deals”, wherein they exchange 
subsidiaries through mergers and acquisitions (M&A) among them as the focus o f the industrial restructuring.
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more liberal position to the corporate sector. In other words, the government will have to reduce 
its role as an economic player by desisting from its past habit o f  intervening in the corporate 
sector. If Chaebols are not performing well, for example, the government should not quickly 
takeover the failing company and hand it over to another Chaebol. The government should let 
the market decide whether the firm should go bankrupt. However, the government still needs to 
maintain its role as a neutral umpire, protecting the market principles and providing a legal 
infrastructure for economic players. In the mean time. Chaebols must try to solve the four given 
moral hazard drive fiaws by focusing on their core businesses that have a chance o f becoming 
internationally competitive, and improving their debt/equity ratios for future growth and 
prosperity.
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